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REPORT ON TRANSFER TAX RESTRUCTURING
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION
TASK FORCE ON TRANSFER TAX RESTRUCTURING*
1. INTRODUCTION
This report is submitted to the Council of the Section of Taxation, American
Bar Association as a proposed response to the request of the Treasury Depart-
ment for suggestions for reform of the Federal transfer taxes (the estate, gift,
and generation-skipping transfer taxes). That request was contained in a letter
dated November 19, 1985, from Ronald A. Pearlman, the Assistant Secretary
(Tax Policy), to Hugh Calkins, then Section Chair.' After receiving individual
comment papers on the subject from members of the Section's Committee on
Estate and Gift Taxes, Mr. Calkins, on April 14, 1986, created this Task Force
and asked it to prepare a more fundamental response.
The Task Force has received comments on an earlier draft of this report
from members of Council, members of the Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes,
and others. Comments of general interest are summarized below:
A. Some view, as the worst feature of the present transfer tax system, the
complexity it generates for estate planning and will and trust drafting. They
state that revision efforts should focus on a simpler and more neutral transfer
tax system.
B. Others observe that change itself is complex. They find even more need
for repose in the transfer taxes than in the income tax. At a minimum, if transfer
tax revision must be attempted, it should be done carefully and with adequate
opportunity for outside study and comment before enactment.
C. Most agree that transfer tax reform would be more acceptable if it were
revenue neutral. Broadening of the transfer tax base (whether as suggested below
or otherwise) should be offset by lower rates, a larger exemption (or equivalent
credit) or both. The issue of the optimum transfer tax revenue yield should,
if addressed, be addressed independently.
While the first two comments are somewhat at odds, our Task Force believes
that all three have merit. Change to reduce complexity is desirable, but should
* This report is reprinted with the permission of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation, which
possesses the copyright.
This report has'not been approved by the Council or membership of the Section of Taxation, and does
not represent the position of the American Bar Association or the Section of Taxation. The members of
the task force are K. Jay Holdsworth (Chair), Ronald D. Aucutt, Edward B. Benjamin, Jr., Kenneth W.
Bergen, and James B. Lewis.
The report was transmitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy of the United States
Treasury Department on May 27, 1987.
'A copy of that letter is attached as Exhibit A. (Ed. Note: All exhibits are represented at the end of this
article.)
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not be undertaken hastily and without opportunity for outside comment.
2. PURPOSES OF THE TRANSFER TAXES
The transfer taxes serve, among other purposes, to limit the perpetuation
of large private concentrations of wealth and, in furtherance of that purpose,
to generate revenue. The gift tax not only backs up the estate tax, but it also
discourages, or compensates for, loss of income tax revenue from transfer of
income-producing assets from one owner to another in lower income tax
brackets.
These are among the appropriate purposes of the federal transfer tax system.
The revenue generated by the transfer taxes should be sufficient to achieve the
above and other appropriate purposes, but it does not necessarily follow that
the transfer taxes need be a major component of the federal revenues.
The present transfer tax system, with modifications, is adequate to carry
out the stated purposes. The virtues of familiarity and working experience make
a modified version of the present system preferable to untested alternatives.
3. THE ISSUE OF COMPLEXITY
As noted above, one of the chief complaints about the present system is
that it complicates estate planning, wills, and trust instruments, perhaps unduly.
A. The nature and magnitude of the issue
To acquaint readers who are unacquainted with this subject with the nature
of the complexity, we attach, as Exhibit B, a will clause illustrative of many
in current use. We submit that a testator, even if above average intelligence,
is unlikely to understand, or if he was once told, to remember, all that such
a will clause is intended to accomplish.
Take the case of H, who has $5 million and his spouse, W, who has no
monetary assets. Assume that H dies first. He may wish to postpone until W's
death payment of estate tax on that portion of his estate that would otherwise
fall into the top rate bracket. To do so, he would qualify that portion of his
estate for the marital deduction. However, to prevent permanent loss of estate
tax savings (particularly, the $600,000 exemption equivalent of the unified credit
and, if desired, the portion of his estate taxable at rates below the top rate),
he must limit the marital deduction so that he has a taxable estate large enough
to absorb those benefits. Will clauses of considerable complexity are used for
that purpose. The portion of the estate thus made ineligible for the marital deduc-
tion is referred to by some as the credit shelter portion or trust.
There is, of course, the risk that W may die first. To prevent the lapse of
the estate tax savings potentially available to W, other estate planning measures
[Vol. 5
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may be taken. H may transfer to W during her life property sufficient to ab-
sorb, at W's death survived by H, the $600,000 exemption equivalent of the
unified credit and, if desired, the lower estate tax rate brackets. W must then
dispose of that property so as not to qualify it for the marital deduction. If
H is unwilling to give W that amount of property, he may give her the income
from the property for life and elect to qualify the property for the gift tax QTIP
marital deduction. In either case, the gift tax marital deduction shields H from
gift tax.
If everyone followed the above courses the only problem would be com-
plexity. The lack of stability of many marriages and other factors impede many
from taking those tax saving steps. The fact that everyone does not act as de-
scribed above introduced the additional factor of inequality in taxation. Those
who do not so act are more heavily taxed than those who do.
We propose in this section 3 a number of reforms that, collectively, would
simplify estate planning, wills, and trust instruments. Briefly stated, these pro-
posals are for a flat tax rate, a flat-rate state death tax credit, conversion of
the unified credit into an exemption, and portability of the exemption between
spouses.
B. Proposed flat rate tax
Tax rate levels are primarily a political and economic issue. Nevertheless,
the choice between the scheduled post-1987 rate structure and a flat rate presents
also an issue of simplification.
The purpose of a progressive rate structure is to implement the concept
of taxation in accordance with ability to pay. However, that purpose could also
be served by utilization of a substantial exemption and a flat rate. The table
below compares, for estates of stated sizes, the progressivity of (a) a low-
exemption progressive-rate estate tax (we have used the pre-1977 estate tax, with
a $60,000 exemption and 25 rate brackets ranging from 3% to 77%) and (b)
a high-exemption flat-rate tax (we have assumed a $600,000 exemption and a
flat 50 % rate). The two right-hand columns show that the effective rate of the
latter tax is approximately as progressive as that of the former.
Taxable
estate Tax under Tax under Effective Effective
before clause (a) clause (b) tax rate tax rate
exemption above above under (a) under (b)
$ 500,000 $ 126,500 $ -0- 25.30% -0-
1,000,000 303,500 200,000 30.35% 20%
2,000,000 726,200 700,000 36.31% 35%
3,000,000 1,231,400 1,200,000 41.05% 40%
4,000,000 1,802,000 1,700,000 45.07% 42.5%
1988]
3
Holdsworth et al.: Transfer Tax Restructuring
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
The scheduled post-1977 seven-bracket rate table (37 % to 50 %)2 is a trun-
cation of the more progressive rate table enacted in 1976. For a taxable estate
that reaches the top 50% bracket, the post-1987 rate table will produce a tax
of only $117,000 less than a flat 50% rate and a $600,000 exemption would
produce. The complexity in estate planning required to duplicate that tax sav-
ing for a married couple is, as we have shown, substantial. Some testators
and their lawyers sacrifice that tax saving, in part to avoid the complexity.
Substitution of a flat rate for the present rate table would simplify estate
planning and still preserve progressivity.
C. Proposed flat-rate state death tax credit
The present limit on the state death tax credit is provided by a 20-bracket
table ranging from 0.8 % for the portion of the taxable estate between $100,000
and $150,000 to 16 % for the portion of the taxable estate exceeding $10,100,000.1
The percentages in that table are set at 80% of the estate tax rates enacted by
the Revenue Act of 1926.
As originally enacted, therefore, that state death tax credit was a straight
percentage (80 %) of the federal estate tax pre-credit liability. Obviously, a straight
percentage is easier to work with than a multi-bracket table. Moreover, there
is no rationale that supports a limit of different percentages on the credit for
estates of different sizes.
Particularly in view of the above suggestion that there be a flat-rate federal
tax, the limit on the state death tax credit should be reformulated as a flat percen-
tage of the federal tax. The determination of the level of that percentage is a
political issue, but there is a good argument for setting a percentage that would
not substantially change the division of death tax revenues between the federal
and state governments.
This proposed change in the state death tax credit should have a significantly
deferred effective date, to permit state governments to consider what, if any,
conforming changes should be made in their death tax statutes.
D. Proposed exemption rather than credit
If the proposal outlined in B above for a flat tax rate is adopted, a unified
exemption should be substituted for the unified credit.
An exemption is preferable to a credit because an exemption is easier to
understand and use. With a flat rate, the argument in favor of a credit, namely,
2 The reference in the text is to that part of the rate table in Code section 2001(b) applicable to estates
exceeding the exemption equivalent of the $600,000 unified credit.
'For post-1986 estates taking the full unified credit against the estate tax, the effective limit on the state
death tax credit is stated in 15 brackets, starting at $600,000 and ranging from 4.8% to 16%.
4 The exempt amount can be determined without multiplication or use of a conversion table.
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that an exemption is worth more to the wealthier who are in the higher brackets,
disappears.
E. Proposed portability of exemption between spouses
Any exemption unused by a married individual or his estate should be made
available for use after his death by his surviving spouse during her life or by
her estate at her death .
If that change were made, married testators would no longer need to utilize,
for the purposes stated in A above, the complex credit shelter trust clauses il-
lustrated by Exhibit B They would also no longer be required to consider lifetime
transfers to the nonpropertied spouse to permit consumption of her exemption
if she dies first.
This proposal for portability of the exemption is consistent with the ex-
isting gift-splitting and marital deduction provisions in treating husband and
wife as, in effect, a single taxable unit.
The considerations that support portability of the exemption between spouses
apply also to the generation-skipping transfer tax exemption. Techniques similar
to those described above may be used today to duplicate that exemption where
one spouse is unpropertied or insufficiently propertied. Portability would
simplify.
In proposing portability of the exemption, we have not overlooked two prob-
lems that we now address. On balance, we submit, our proposal is simplifying
despite the presence of those problems.
(i) Situation where nonpropertied spouse dies first
Assume that the first spouse to die is W, who has either no monetary assets
or insufficient such assets to utilize fully the exemption.
We recommend that, as a condition to the proposed portability, W's ex-
ecutor be required to file a timely estate tax return. A simplified return form
(say, Form 706EZ) might be promulgated for that purpose.
Because that return would show no estate tax liability, the Internal Revenue
Service would not be expected to audit the return. For that reason, the Service
should be permitted to adjust values on W's return when it audits H's subse-
quent return, but, if three years have expired after the filing of W's return,
only for the purpose of determining H's estate tax liability.
Any human tendency to understate the value of W's assets would, at least
5 Unless otherwise stated, references in this report to the donor spouse or deceased spouse are in the masculine
gender and references to the donee spouse or surviving spouse are in the feminine gender.
6 They might have other reasons for creating nonmarital deduction gifts or bequests (e.g., to make current
provision for children or to shield future appreciation in value from tax), but the trust or will clauses
used for those purposes could be simple.
19881
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to some extent, be offset by the human tendency not to lose some income tax
basis by understating their value.
While, in itself, the need for W's estate tax return complicates, we regard
that complication as necessary to attain the simplification of portability of
exemption.
The above procedure would be simplified where, as would frequently oc-
cur, W left everything to H. In that case, W's executor could, by checking the
appropriate box on the return, avoid having to list on the return W's properties
and their values.
(ii) Successive marriages
The other problem is whether the prospect of successive marriages makes
portability unworkable. We do not see the problem as a sufficiently serious
one to block portability.
First, we are proposing portability at death only, and not on divorce. The
Tommy Manville scenario, therefore, is irrelevant to our proposal 7 We know
of husbands who have buried two, or even three, wives, but they are relatively
rare.
Next, there is no problem where the propertied spouse dies first. Today,
that spouse's estate tax benefits are generally used at his death by limiting the
marital deduction. Under the proposal, portability would be an alternative.
We shall consider two situations in which the nonpropertied spouse (iden-
tified as W) dies first and H remarries.
Order of deaths: W1, W2, H. Various rules could be devised. Subject to
the further discussion below, the assets of W1 and W2, or the assets of W2 only
might be counted.
Order of deaths: W1, H, W2. The prospect of three exemptions, either to-
day or under portability, must be considered.
Today, Wl's exemption is utilized if H makes a sufficient lifetime transfer
to her or for her benefit and she does not return the property to H. By making
part of his estate ineligible for the marital deduction, H utilizes his exemption
and enables W2 to utilize her exemption. Three exemptions are, with careful
planning, thus utilized today. Allowance of three exemptions under portability
would, therefore, not exceed the number available today.
To return to the earlier-discussed order of deaths (W], W2, H), three ex-
emptions are also available today. H would have to transfer sufficient property
during life, first to or for the benefit of W1 and later to or for the benefit of
7Had present law been in effect, Mr. Manville could have made a lifetime transfer to each of his 11 suc-
cessive blond young wives, creating a total of 12 exemptions including his own.
[Vol. 5
6
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 5 [1988], Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol5/iss1/7
TRANSFER TAX RESTRUCTURING
W2, and W1 and W2 would have to make adequate nonmarital bequests.
The prospect of successive marriages did not prevent enactment of the
marital deduction or the subsequent lifting of the 50% limitation thereon. We
are aware of no evidence of significant abuse. The same should be true, we
suggest, of the proposed portability.
F. Revenue neutrality
The proposed flat tax rate, if it were set at 50%, would increase the tax
liability on that portion of the taxable estate that does not exceed $2.5 million
by as much as $117,000. The other proposals described above would have smaller
revenue impact !I The dominant revenue impact of a 50 % flat rate suggests that
compensating revenue neutrality should take the form of an increased exemp-
tion rather than rate reduction.
Inevitably, enactment of the above proposals and a compensating increase
in the exemption would increase estate tax burdens of some estates and reduce
those of others. We show below the tax impact for taxable estates at various
levels up to $2,500,000, computed under the arbitrary assumption that an ex-
emption increase from $600,000 to $750,000 would make the above proposals
revenue neutral.
Tax with assumed Increase
Taxable Tax under $750,000 exemption (or decrease)
estate present law and 50% rate in tax
$ 750,000 $ 55,500 -0- ($55,500)
1,000,000 153,500 $125,000 ( 28,500)
1,250,000 255,500 250,000 ( 5,500)
1,328,571 289,286 289,286 -0-
1,500,000 363,000 375,000 12,000
2,000,000 588,000 625,000 37,000
2,500,000 833,000 875,000 42,000
In short, estates of more than $1,328,571 would have their taxes increased,
but in no case by more than approximately 5 % (maximum of $42,000). Estates
of less than $1,328,571 would have their taxes decreased by as much as $55,500,
with the larger decreases in the lower levels.
Those changes in tax burden must, of course, be weighed against the
simplification that would flow from the above proposals. We submit that the
arguments for simplification should prevail.
'The proposed flat-rate state death tax credit would benefit smaller estates and increase tax on larger estates.
The proposed exemption portability would benefit, primarily, the less sophisticated estate planners and
thus, presumably, the smaller estates.
1988]
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4. GIFT TAX ANNUAL EXCLUSION
The present per-donee gift tax exclusion has led to complex rules and to
serious tax avoidance, particularly in the use of so-called Crummey trusts.
Moreover, the current level of the per-donee exclusion permits large-scale escape
from transfer tax for a donor with many descendants or other donees.
An obvious alternative would be substitution of a flat per-donor annual
exclusion of say, $30,000. However, a $30,000 annual exclusion might be regarded
as excessive in some situations, for instance, for a divorced or widowed parent
with one child.
The proposal below responds to the above problems. Under the proposal:
A. Subject to paragraphs B through E below, the first $10,000 of gifts to
each donee in any calendar year would be excluded.
B. ABA Legislative Recommendation No. 1958-11 would be enacted to
replace the "other than gifts of future interests" provisions of Code sections
2503(b) and (c)? If that were done, the interests qualifying for the exclusion
might be described as "vested interests." See the comment in the last paragraph
of this section 4.
C. The total exclusions for any calendar year, thus computed, would be
limited to a maximum of, say, $30,000 per donor. The following gifts would
not count against the $30,000: charitable or marital gifts deductible under Code
section 2522 or 2523 or gifts to political organizations excluded by Code sec-
tion 2501(a)(5).
D. To eliminate concern over the possible need to report relatively small
gifts in excess of the $30,000, there would be an additional de minimis per-
donee exclusion (of, say, $100) for donees not covered by the $30,000. That
would prevent the requirement of a return where, for example, a widow gives
$10,000 to each of her three sons and a $20 graduation present to a niece.
E. The above $10,000, $30,000, and $100 amounts would be doubled for
a married couple.
The above proposal is built on the current $10,000 per-donee exclusion,
and the amounts are intended to be illustrative. Other monetary limits could
be established; the levels are political or economic issues. The proposal should
be considered in conjunction with the proposal in section 5 below relating to
the exclusion for educational and medical expenses.
The proposal in paragraph B would make Crummey powers unnecessary
in many cases, i.e., where the donor chooses to create vested interests. To com-
plete the elimination of the Crummey problem, it would also be necessary to
tax the lapse of a "five-and-five" power of appointment, as proposed in sec-
9 A copy of ABA Legislative Recommendation No. 1958-11 is attached as Exhibit C.
[Vol. 5
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tion 10A below.
5. GIFT TAX EXCLUSION FOR EDUCATIONAL AND. MEDICAL EXPENSES, ETC.
The monetarily unlimited gift tax exclusions for payments of educational
expenses and medical expenses should remain in effect. The exclusion for educa-
tional expenses should be expanded to cover items other than tuition. If that
were done, the rule requiring payment directly to the supplier should be re-
laxed, at least in part.
Under the present law, payments for support of someone who is not the
donor's legal dependent are gifts for gift tax purposes because they are not in
discharge of the donor's legal obligation. The rationale for excluding payments
of educational and medical expenses of nondependents logically extends to other
payments for support of nondependents. This problem would be exacerbated
by enactment of the $30,000 per-donor exclusion cap proposed in section 4 above.
The difficulty in extending the exclusion to other support payments to
nondependents lies in the potential for abuse. That difficulty has led us to con-
clude, reluctantly, that the exclusion should not be extended to cover suppqrt
payments for nondependents other than for educational and medical expenses.
6. GROSS-UP OF GIFT TAX
Under the present law, the estate tax base is tax-inclusive and the gift tax
base tax-exclusive.10
A. The Treasury proposal
The Treasury Department, in its 1984 report to the President on tax reform,"
proposed that the gift tax base be made tax-inclusive. The Treasury advanced
two arguments in support of that proposal. First, its adoption would, by
eliminating one of the preferences accorded lifetime gifts, make the transfer
tax system more neutral. t2 Second, its adoption would facilitate adoption of a
uniform and simpler set of gift and estate tax rules for determining when a
10The following example contrasts the tax-inclusive (estate tax) and tax-exclusive (gift tax) bases. In 1988,
when the top transfer tax rate is scheduled to drop to 50 percent, A, a widower with one child (S), has
made taxable gifts of $2.5 million in prior years (all more than three years previously), has given S $10,000
(the amount qualifying for the gift tax exclusion) during 1988, and has $1 million remaining. In that situation:
(a) If A dies and leaves his estate to S, the estate tax will be $500,000 and S will receive $500,000.
(b) If A instead makes a lifetime gift of his property to S, retaining $333,333 to pay the gift tax on
the donated $666,657, and if A survives that gift by three years (thus escaping the grasp of Code
section 2035(c)), S as A's donee will receive $666,667 (one-third more than under subparagraph
(a)). To produce the same tax in the above example, the estate tax rate would have to be reduced
to 33-1/3 percent or, alternatively, the gift tax rate would have to be increased to 100 percent.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH, (1984).
'
21d. at 376. The Treasury acknowledged that other preferences for lifetime gifts would remain, namely,
the $10,000 annual exclusion and the elimination from the tax base of post-gift appreciation in the value
of the transferred property. Id.
1988]
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transfer is complete. 3
B. Introductory comment
If this feature of the transfer taxes is viewed in isolation, there are arguments
for and against the Treasury proposal. The argument for the proposal is, sim-
ply stated, a vote for tax rate neutrality. The arguments against the proposal
are two:
(1) Many believe that a transfer tax system that encourages lifetime giving
is socially and economically beneficial because such a system causes business
and investment capital to be moved into the hands of younger, more vigorous
owners.
(2) If the gift tax is regarded as an advance payment of estate tax, the
Treasury has the earlier use of the tax money. The gift tax advantage, therefore,
may be analogized to a discount for early payment. To obtain that discount,
the payment must be substantially (more than three years) early, because of
the gross-up of gift tax required by Code section 2035(c) for gifts made within
three years of death.
On the narrowly-focused debate outlined above, views (including those of
members of the task force) might be expected to diverge. However, when other
features of the existing transfer tax system are taken into account, the case for
the Treasury proposal becomes more tenuous, as we shall now show.
C. Income tax basis
Property that has appreciated in value, if transferred at death, is given a
new income tax basis equal to its fair market value on the estate tax valuation
date. If transferred by gift, the basis of such property is augmented only by
the gift tax allocable, under a proportional formula, to the element of the gift
consisting of unrealized appreciation in value.
In his letter to Mr. Calkins (Exhibit A), Mr. Pearlman observed that, for
gifts in the top 50% rate bracket, the Treasury proposal would cause basis to
be stepped up to fair market value.14 We have several problems with that
observation.
First, the result is merely fortuitous. If rates are reduced, disparity will
be reintroduced.
Second, relatively few gifts are taxed in the top bracket. For all gifts below
that bracket, i.e., for almost all gifts, the gift tax basis adjustment does not
131d. at 378.
14To illustrate, assume a gift by a top-bracket donor of property having an income tax basis of $300,000
and a fair market value of $800,000. The gift tax, if the tax base is made tax-inclusive and the top rate
is 50%, would be $800,000. Five-eighths of that tax ($500,000), the portion allocable to the unrealized
appreciation in value, would be added to basis, stepping basis up to fair market value.
[Vol. 5
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fully eliminate gain.
Third, the adjustment described by Mr. Pearlman does not aid the donor
who must sell other appreciated property to pay the gift tax. Assume, in the
example in footnote 14, that the donor must sell other property, which is also
worth $800,000 but has a basis of $300,000, to make the gift tax payment. The
donor thus incurs income tax on the $500,000 of gain. No similar problem
arises for transfers at death, because the basis of all property so transferred
(including the portion that has to be sold to pay estate tax) is adjusted to fair
market value.
D. Other differences
Other Code provisions that provide relief or benefits in connection with
the estate tax, but not the gift tax, are section 303 (redemption of stock to pay
estate taxes), section 2032 (alternate valuation), section 2032A (special use valua-
tion), and sections 6161(a) (2), 6163, and 6166 (deferment of payment of estate
tax).
E. Concluding observations
It may be reasonably argued, therefore, that the present system is one of
rough justice. Our task force believes that the Treasury proposal should not
be enacted at least so long as the income tax basis of property in the gross
estate continues to be adjusted to fair market value.'5
Also, in our opinion, gross-up of the gift tax is not essential to adoption
of a uniform set of completed transfer rules (see section 7 below). The fact
that estate tax collections exceed by many times gift tax collections indicates
that the preferences accorded gifts are not sufficient to deplete estate tax revenues
seriously. We do not believe that the uniform transfer completion rules pro-
posed below would significantly tilt the balance.
7. UNIFORM TRANSFER COMPLETION RULES
A. Introduction
Approximately 40 years ago a Treasury study recommended adoption of
a uniform set of rules, for gift and estate tax purposes, of what is a completed
transfer.' 6 Unification of the gift and estate taxes in 1976 (also an objective of
the Treasury study) makes adoption of a uniform set of such rules even more
desirable.
"5See in that connection section 14 below.
16The Treasury study also recommended that those rules be correlated with the income tax. Although
we recognize the argument for at least substantial conformity with the grantor trust rules, other considera-
tions, discussed below, have led us to propose a set of transfer tax rules that are not conducive to such
conformity.
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Present law is, briefly, as follows:
(i) Gift tax: A gift is incomplete when the donor has retained dominion
and control, so as to leave him with power to change the disposition of the
property for his own benefit or for the benefit of another. Regs. section 25.2511-2.
(ii) Estate tax: A lifetime transfer is incomplete if the transferor (a) re-
tains dominion and control (i.e., the power to change the disposition of the
property for his own benefit or for the benefit of another), (b) retains the in-
come from the transferred property or dominion and control over the income
(whether for his own benefit or the benefit of another), (c) retains a sufficient-
ly large reversionary interest in the property and postpones enjoyment of subse-
quent interests of others therein until his death, or (d) in the case of transferred
stock, retains voting power. Code sections 2036 through 2038.
The above-stated rules are further complicated by other differences be-
tween the two taxes: (a) Powers to change the disposition held jointly by the
transferor and another person make the transfer incomplete, except that, for
gift tax purposes only, the transfer is complete if the other person has a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of the property. (b) Where the transferor em-
powers another person to return the property to the transferor, some court deci-
sions suggest that the transfer may be complete for estate tax purposes 7 but
not the gift tax purposes. 8 (c) Powers to accumulate income or to invade prin-
cipal apparently do not prevent a transfer from being complete, but only if they
cannot be used to shift the disposition from the income beneficiary to the re-
mainderman or vice versa.' 9
We propose a much simpler set of rules, to be applied for both gift and
estate tax purposes: Two categories of transfers would be incomplete: (a) Those
under which the transferor can recover the transferred property, through exer-
cise of a power retained by him or conferred by him on another; and (b) those
under which the transferor will receive the income from the transferred prop-
erty, or can do so through exercise of a power retained by him or conferred
by him to another. All other transfers would be complete, including those with
retained dominion and control over disposition among persons other than the
transferor. One of our objectives is to create relatively bright lines that will
minimize uncertainty and controversy.
17 E.g., Estate of Sherman v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 594 (1947); McCullough v. Granger, 128 F Supp.
611 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
18E.g., Estate ofGramm v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1063 (1951). But see Rev. Rul. 54-538, 1954-2 C.B. 316.
19 Compare Regs. § 25.2511-2(d) (gift tax) with the cases cited infra note 24 (estate tax).
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B. The proposed rules
The proposed uniform transfer completion rules are, in more detail,
as follows:
Rule a: Revocable transfers
A revocable transfer would be an incomplete transfer for gift and estate
tax purposes.
The term "revocable transfer" would be broadly defined to include a transfer
subject to any express power to return the transferred property to the transferor.
Such powers would include powers so exercisable solely by the transferor, by
the transferor in conjunction with another person or persons, or solely by another
person or persons. In other words, the transfer would be complete only if the
transferor does not create a power expressly exercisable for his own benefit.
The above rule would apply without regard to whether the power is sub-
ject to an ascertainable standard. The rule would also apply without regard
to whether the holder of the power has a substantial adverse interest.
However, the following powers would not make a transfer revocable: (1) The
ability of the transferee as owner of the property to give or bequeath the prop-
erty back to the donor. (2) A general power of appointment created by the in-
strument of transfer in a person other than the transferor. (3) A nongeneral power
of appointment (exercisable in favor of a defined class or classes of persons
or in favor of anyone other than designated persons or classes of persons) created
by the instrument of transfer in a person other than the transferor, even though
the transferor is not excluded as a potential appointee. If these exceptions were
not made, outright transfers and other traditional forms of disposition would
be incomplete.
In developing this proposed rule, we started with two assumptions: (1) that
a revocable transfer should be incomplete and (2) that an outright gift should
be complete. Of the many intermediate points at which the line could be drawn,
the one proposed by us has, at least, the virtue of certainty. Wherever the line
is drawn, there will be cases on either side that resemble one another. Those
cases, under our proposal, are the express power in another to return the prop-
erty to the transferor (incomplete) and the nongeneral power in another to appoint
among a class that includes the transferor (complete) .z
The rule under discussion (Rule a) would apply to currently exercisable
powers over the principal of the transferred property. A power over income
only would be tested under Rule c below. A power over a future interest would
be tested under Rule d below.
20 We propose to treat as complete transfers that confer nongeneral powers of appointment of the sorit described
in the text on persons other than the transferor, because of their common use.
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Examples showing the operation of Rule a are set forth below:
(i) T, owner of Blackacre in fee, transfers Blackacre, reserving a power
to revoke. The transfer is incomplete under Rule a.
(ii) Same as (i), except that the power to revoke extends only to an estate
for T's life. The transfer is wholly incomplete but the operative rule is Rule
c below, and not Rule a.21
(iii) Same as (i), except that the power extends only to a future interest.
Rule d, and not Rule a, applies.
(iv) Same as (i), except that the power extends only to, say, an undivided
one-third fractional interest, an undivided 15 % interest, an interest described
in terms of value (a $100,000 undivided interest), or an interest described by
metes and bounds, in the Blackacre fee. Rule a applies pro tanto.
(v) Same as (i), except that T, not having reserved the power to revoke,
later had such a power conferred on him independently (i.e., not pursuant to
an understanding had at the time of transfer). The transfer is complete. Subjec-
tion of the transferred property to estate tax on T's death would be tested under
the power of appointment provisions. That would eliminate the second paren-
thetical expression in Code section 2038(a)(1) (the words "without regard to
when or from what source the decedent acquired such power"), but would codify
the last sentence of Regulations section 20.2035-1(a).
(vii) Same as (i), except that the power is exercisable by Tin conjunction
with another person or persons. The transfer is incomplete under Rule a 2
(viii) Same as (i), except that the power is exercisable solely by another
person or persons. The gift is incomplete under Rule a.23
Rule b: Retained power to vary beneficial interests of others
A transfer with no power to revoke but with a power to vary the bene-
ficial interests of other persons would be a completed transfer for gift and estate
tax purposes.
In developing Rule b, we started with the desire to eliminate the result of
estate tax cases that treat as incomplete transfers in trust with the reserved power
to accumulate income or invade corpus.2 4 Finding it hard to distinguish such
powers from powers to vary beneficial interests of others generally, we decided
I Consistent with the scope of Rule a, the results stated in example (ii) (and in the succeeding example
(iii)) would apply without regard to whether the power is subject to an ascertainable standard or whether
the holder has a substantial adverse interest.
22 Suggested conforming changes to the power of appointment provisions are discussed in section IOD below.
23 See supra note 22.
24 E.g., Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480
(1946); Struthers v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955); Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d
142 (lst Cir. 1947); Estate of Yawkey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949).
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to eliminate all such powers as taxable strings if they cannot be exercised in
favor of the transferor. Although we realize that Rule b may impede correlation
of the transfer taxes with the income tax in this area, we nevertheless support
the proposed rule for the reasons stated.
We note that adoption of Rules a and b would neutralize, from the
transfer tax standpoint, the trust creator's choice of himself or another as
trustee. In doing so, these proposed rules would put to rest the controversy
engendered by Rev. Rul. 79-353, 2 which held that retention by the creator of
a discretionary trust of the power to change the trustee made the transfer
incomplete for estate tax purposes. That should permit, and make desirable,
revocation of Rev. Rul. 79-353.6
Enactment of Rule b would require elimination of those portions of Code
sections 2036(a)(1) and 2038 that relate to powers not exercisable in favor of
the transferor.
Rule c: Retained income interest
A transfer with a retained income interest would be an incomplete transfer
for gift and estate tax purposes, i.e., there would be a tax at expiration of the
retained interest. The gift tax now imposed on the lifetime transfer of the re-
mainder would be eliminated.
For this purpose, consistent with Rule a, the transferor would be treated
as retaining an income interest if he or anyone else has an express power to
pay the income to the transferor. Here again, the ascertainable standard and
adverse interest concepts would be eliminated.
A problem in applying Rule c would arise where the transferor transfers
property in trust and retains either an annuity payable out of trust income or
principal, or the right to withdraw a fixed amount or percentage of principal,
annually. We propose that such payments be treated, for purposes of Rule c,
as though they were income. There would remain a problem of measurement.
If the payment or amount withdrawable is less than the entire income,. the transfer
would be incomplete pro tanto; if it is equal to or greater than income, the
transfer would be wholly incomplete. The statute should, we propose, provide
that such measurement be established by prediction, utilizing a prescribed rate
of return.
Another problem in applying Rule c would arise where A transfers prop-
erty to B in return for B's promise to make a stream of payments (such as a
life annuity) to A. At one extreme, the transaction may be economically
equivalent to retention of all or a part of the income. At the other, it may be
25 1979-2 C.B. 325.
26ABA Legislative Recommendations No. 1984-4 recommends that the Internal Revenue Code be amend-
ed to overrule the result of Rev. Rul. 79-353.
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a sale for full (or for substantial, but inadequate) consideration. Here again,
there are problems of classification, which the statute should address.
Examples showing the application of Rule c, in addition to Example (ii)
under Rule a, follow:
(i) T, owner of Whiteacre in fee, transfers Whiteacre, reserving a life estate.
Rule c applies, so that there would be an estate tax at T's death but no gift
tax on the lifetime transfer.
(ii) Same as (i), except that T reserves the right to have the income for
his life used to discharge his support obligations or otherwise for his pecuniary
benefit. Rule c should, in theory, apply, but we note the valuation problem
presented.
(iii) Same as (i), except that T reserves a fractional, percentile, or other-
wise identifiable share of the income for his life. Rule c applies to a cor-
responding share of Whiteacre.
(iv) Same as (i), except that T reserves an estate for 10 years and dies within
that period. Rule c applies, without regard to T's life expectancy at the time
of transfer.
(v) Same as (iv), except that T survives the transfer by more than 10 years.
The expiration of T's term of enjoyment is a gift of Whiteacre. There is no
estate tax, subject to the potential application of Code section 2035(c).
(vi) Same as (i), except that income from Whiteacre is payable to someone
else (say, T's sister S) for life and, if T survives S, to T for the balance of T's
life. Rule c does not apply, because a retained secondary life estate is not to
be treated as a retained life estate for that purpose. There is an immediate gift
of the whole of Whiteacre (as under Rule d below). The ripening into enjoy-
ment of the retained secondary life estate will terminate at death.
(vii) Same as (vi), except that T's sister S receives income from Whiteacre
for one month and T receives such income for the balance of his life. Rule
c applies. A brief primary income interest in another person should be disregard-
ed, because Rule c would otherwise become, essentially, elective. Some ar-
bitrary rule of substantiality should be developed for this purpose (e.g., for
the transfer to be complete, S's interest would have to be either a life estate
or an interest the present value of which is, say, 20% of the value of Whiteacre).
(viii) Same as (i), except that T transferred Whiteacre in trust, reserved
to himself semiannual payments of trust income, and further provided that the
trust income between the last semiannual payment date and his death should
not be paid to Tor his estate. Rule c applies. That corresponds to present law.
(ix) Same as (i), except that someone (T, another person, or both) has an
express power to pay the income from the transferred property to T for life.
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Rule c applies, i.e., the income is treated as reserved.
(x) Same as (i), except that T, instead of reserving the income, obtains
the transferee's promise to pay Tan annuity for life equal in amount to the ex-
pected income. Rule c applies (but see the discussion in the fourth paragraph
under this rule).
Rule d: Transfer with reserved future interest
A transfer under which the transferor retains a future interest in the trans-
ferred property would be fully subject to gift tax, without any carving out of
the value of the retained future interest. Code section 2037 would be repealed,
so as to reduce the impact of the estate tax in this area.
We begin with the view that a retained future interest, unlike a retained
income interest, does not make the transfer inherently testamentary. Second,
we wish to eliminate the gift tax difficulty of carving out by valuation, actuarially
or by other means, the retained future interest. Third, by imposition of gift
tax in all such cases, the need to classify for estate tax purposes retained future
interests by character or size would become unnecessary. Most retained future
interests are obliterated by the transferor's death27 so that there would be no
estate tax if Code section 2037 is repealed.
The following situations, however, must be considered:
(i) The transferor may have retained an absolute reversion in himself and
his estate. An example is the popular Clifford ten-year term trust that was used
to shift taxation of income before enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
On the death of the transferor during the term of the trust, the reversion is in-
cludible in the gross estate under Code section 2033 as property owned by him.
(ii) The transferor may be the fee owner of the property at death because
the retained future interest has become possessory. For example, if A transfers
Blackacre to A's sister (S) for life, with reversion to A if he survives S, and
remainder to their brother (B) if A predeceases S, A again owns Blackacre in
fee if S predeceases him. On A's subsequent death Blackacre is includible in
his gross estate under Code section 2033.
We do not suggest that section 2033 be made inoperative in the above situa-
tions. In the first situation the remainder interest would be taxed twice, and
in the second the fee would be taxed twice. If desired, the statute could provide
for offset of the first tax against the second.
An example relating to Rule d is Example (iii) under Rule a.
17That is so of the future interests retained in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), and its progeny,
such as Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949). Many other such interests are too remote
to be valued, e.g., the interest in Francis Biddle Trust v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 832 (1944).
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Rule e: Retained voting power over transferred stock
Retained power to vote transferred stock should not make the transfer in-
complete. Such a power should be classified with a retained power to vary
beneficial interests (Rule b). Therefore, Code section 2036(b) should be repealed
and the result of Byrum v. United States,2 1 codified.
C. Comments on the proposed rules
In certain respects, the above proposals would make gifts harder to com-
plete. That would be true of transfers that are complete under present law but
that would become incomplete under the proposed broader reach of Rules a
and c.
In other respects, the above proposals would reduce application of the estate
tax to lifetime transfers. That would be true under Rules b, d, and e.
The proposals would greatly reduce overlap between the gift and estate
taxes and, therefore, the scope of the final clause ("other than gifts which are
includible in the gross estate of the decedent") of Code section 2001(b).
D. Transition problems in introducing the proposed rules
For gift tax purposes, the above proposals would apply to gifts (as rede-
fined) made after some reasonable prospective date (if appropriate, on or after
the succeeding January 1).
If a lifetime transfer would otherwise be subjected to gift tax twice (first,
under prior law before that effective date and, second, under new law after
that date), the second tax would not be imposed.
For estate tax purposes, appropriate transition rules should also be pro-
vided. Any preenactment transfer excluded from the gross estate under prior
law, but includible under the proposal, should be protected from inclusion.
Any preenactment transfer includible in the gross estate under prior law, but
excluded under the proposal, should be included.
8. TRANSFERS FOR PARTIAL CONSIDERATION
As under present law, transfers for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth would not be subject to transfer tax. The gratuitous
element of a transfer for partial consideration would continue to be taxed. The
present rule that relinquishment of marital rights in the decedent's property
or estate is not consideration in money or money's worth would be preserved.
The application of the estate tax to lifetime transfers for partial con-
28408 U.S. 125 (1972).
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sideration should be revised and clarified. Code section 2043(a) should be
replaced by the more rational formula of ABA Legislative Recommendation
No. 1970-5.29 The peculiar results of valuing the consideration at the date of
transfer and the property at the date of death would thus be eliminated. Propor-
tional inclusion is more logical than the holdings in cases such as Estate of
Davis v. Commissioner30
9. SURVIVOR BENEFITS (SECTION 2039)
Code section 2039 should be amended to eliminate as a test for inclusion
of an annuity or other payment in the gross estate thereunder, the possession
by the decedent of a right to receive an annuity or payment.31 All contractual
or statutory survivor benefits economically attributable to the decedent would
thus be includible in the gross estate. Examples are Social Security death benefits
and copyright renewal or termination rights. These rules would cover all
payments to a survivor because of the decedent's services, whether as employee
or independent contractor. (We also suggest that the title of section 2039 be
changed from "Annuities" to "Survivor Benefits.")
All survivor benefits would be taxable at death only, and would in no case
constitute lifetime gifts. If the nonemployee spouse were to die first, no prop-
erty right in the benefit would be included in that spouse's gross estate, but
there would be full taxation on the subsequent death of the employee spouse.
These rules would apply to community property, to awards on divorce or separa-
tion, and to rights created by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984.
Section 2039 would be the exclusive estate tax provision applicable to such
payments, to the exclusion of section 2033 and sections 2036-2038.32 Section
2039, like present section 2042 (relating to life insurance proceeds), would apply
to payments receivable by the executor.33
Section 2039 would also continue to cover commercial annuities, to the
exclusion of section 2036.
Our task force has reached no consensus over the applicability of section
29A copy of ABA Legislative Recommendation No. 1970-5 is attached as Exhibit D.
30440 F2d 896 (3d Cir. 1971).
3 1 That would overrule the result in such cases as Estate of Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct.
Cl. 1969), and Estate of Fusz v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 214 (1966). Death benefits of the type discussed
in Technical Advice Memorandum 8701003, Sept. 19, 1986, would come within the scope of section 2039
as thus amended.
3 2The following decisions, among others, which held such payments to be includible under Code section
2033 under prior law, would have no continuing effect: Commissioner v. Estate of Albright, 356 F.2d
319 (2d Cir. 1966); Rosenberg v. United States, 309 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1962); Estate of Garber v. Commis-
sioner, 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959); Estate of Wolf v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 441 (1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 264 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1959); Beaver Trust Co. v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
"See, e.g., Goodman v. Granger, 243 F2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). The holding
of that case that inclusion is not impaired by the fact that the right to the payments had not vested during
the decedent's life is intended to survive.
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2039 to wrongful death benefits arising from the decedent's death.34 Some of
our members argue that there is no principle for excluding such benefits from
the scope of section 2039, but others note that the valuation problem is dif-
ficult and may not be resolved during the estate tax assessment period.
A tax apportionment provision similar to that provided in Code section
2206 for insurance proceeds should be enacted for survivor benefits. In com-
munity property situations, where one-half of the benefit belongs to the
nonemployee spouse (if she survives), or to the beneficiaries under her will
(if she does not survive), the tax on that one-half of the benefit would be ap-
portioned accordingly.
The marital deduction provision should be amended to qualify survivor
benefits for that deduction if payment of such benefits begins reasonably promptly
after the decedent's death and if all such payments during the life of his sur-
viving spouse are payable, at least annually, to such spouse or to a trust for
her benefit that qualifies for the marital deduction. That would eliminate the
need, as a condition to qualification for the marital deduction, to provide that
payments after the death of the spouse be made to her estate.
10. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
General powers of appointment should continue to be subjected to gift or
estate tax. Such powers are too much like outright ownership to be treated dif-
ferently. The generation-skipping transfer tax is not an adequate surrogate.
A. "Five-and-five" powers of appointment
Code sections 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e), which shelter from tax the lifetime
lapse of a power to the extent that the appointive property does not exceed the
greater of $5,000 or 5 % of the assets involved, should be repealed. There is
no conceptual justification for that exception.3 5 Five percent of a large trust
can have a substantial value. This "five-and-five" exception and the resulting
Crummey problem discussed above, may be routinely exploited by some
sophisticated taxpayers. The treatment of the power-holder as the grantor of
the affected portions of the trust for income tax purposes creates an area of
noncompliance for unsophisticated taxpayers.
Repeal would ameliorate these problems by discouraging the routine crea-
tion of "five-and-five" powers. Repeal should be accompanied by appropriate
"grandfathering" provisions. Post-repeal additions to existing trusts should not
be so protected.
34Tort and contract claims that pass from the decedent under his will are, of course, includible in his
gross estate under Code section 2033.
35 Although some argue that the "five-and-five" power relieves pressures on independent trustees, the task
force does not think that argument justifies retention of the "five-and-five" exception.
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B. Powers of appointment subject to an ascertainable standard
We recommend that powers to invade for the benefit of the holder that are
subject to an ascertainable standard be allowed to remain nontaxable. See Code
sections 2041(b)(1)(A) and 2514(c)(1).
In making that recommendation, we are aware (1) that we propose above
(section 7B, Rule a) elimination of the ascertainable standard exception for
retained powers and (2) that uncertainty over whether particular words create
an ascertainable standard is common to the two areas. Our proposal for retained
powers is that, to make a transfer complete, the transferor must eliminate himself
as a potential beneficiary. That proposal does not require that, as a corollary,
powers of appointment subject to an ascertainable standard be subjected to
transfer tax.
Assume that A creates a trust for his son (S), makes the income payable
to S, and gives S a power to invade principal for S's health, education, or
maintenance. If S exercises the power, there is, of course, no transfer tax because
S has not transferred property to someone else. If S, in any year, does not exer-
cise the power, it may be because he was not entitled under the standard to
do so; here also, there should be no tax. If S fails to exercise the power even
though he is entitled to do so, there is no tax if he can exercise it in the future.
(For example, S drops out of college for a year, but reenters in the next year.)
Even where a lapse could be alleged, there would be the difficult problem of
measurement of the amount transferred.
These powers do not sufficiently involve the ceding of control over prop-
erty to others to justify imposition of transfer tax on the holder of the power.
C. Nongeneral powers of appointment
We recommend retention of the present definition of a general power of
appointment as a power exercisable in favor of the holder, his estate, his creditors,
or the creditors of his estate.
We acknowledge that the holder of a power exercisable in favor of anyone
other than the holder, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate'
has substantial dominion and control over the appointive property. However,
a broader definition of a general power would introduce undesirable rigidity
into dispositive instruments. Such a definition was attempted in the power of
appointment provision enacted by the Revenue Act of 1942, and was the sub-
ject of much complaint.
Moreover, the subjection of such conferred powers to tax would be incon-
sistent with our proposal above with respect to reserved powers (section 7B,
Rule b).
The present classification (beneficial vs. nonbeneficial powers) has, at least,
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the virtue of producing a relatively bright line. For that and other reasons, it
should be retained.
D. Powers that make a lifetime transfer incomplete
The term "general power of appointment" is defined to exclude a power
exercisable jointly with the creator of the power.3 6 The unstated (but apparent)
purpose of this exclusion is to prevent, or at least to reduce, overlap between
the power of appointment and incomplete lifetime transfer provisions. The power
retained by the transferor will make the lifetime transfer incomplete under Code
section 2038 (if the power is over the transferred property) or 2036 (if the power
is over the income therefrom). Because the transferor remains potentially sub-
ject to transfer tax, the donee coholder's power is exempted.
If the incomplete lifetime provisions are revised as our task force has pro-
posed (section 7B, supra), a conforming change should be made in the power
of appointment definition. The term "general power of appointment" should
be redefined to exclude any express power to return the transferred property
to the transferor or to pay the income from that property to the transferor. Phrased
differently, the excluded power would be any power that makes the lifetime
transfer incomplete.
E. Joint powers
The present estate and gift tax statutes provide three rules governing
jointly-held powers of appointment, which we summarize (and, for con-
venience, label) below:
Rule x: As stated in D above, a power exercisable jointly with the creator
of the power is not a general power of appointment.3 7
Rule y: A power exercisable jointly with a person other than the creator
is not a general power of appointment if that person has a substantial interest
in the appointive property adverse to exercise of the power.38
Rule z: A jointly-held power not covered by Rule x or y is a general power
of appointment in the hands of any holder on behalf of whom the power can
be exercised. If there is more than one such holder, each has a general power
of appointment over an aliquot share of the appointive property.39
If our proposal in D above is enacted, Rule x should be repealed.
To discuss concretely Rules y and z, we hypothesize a power held jointly
361.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(I)(C)(i), 2514(c)(3)(A).
371 R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(C)(i), 2514(c)(3)(A).
381.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(C)(ii), 2514(c)(3)(B).
39 1.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(l)(C)(iii), 2514(c)(3)(C).
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by A and B (neither of whom is the creator of the power) to appoint Blackacre.
We note that:
(i) Rule y apparently applies to A (so that A has no general power of ap-
pointment) where A is a permissible appointee and B is the taker in default
of appointment. B's interest as taker in default is substantially adverse to ap-
pointment to A.
(ii) In situation (i), Rule y seems incomplete in not addressing the tax status
of B.
(iii) If Rule y does not apply, and if A is a permissible appointee but B
is not, A alone has a general power of appointment over Blackacre (Rule z).
(iv) If A and B are both permissible appointees and neither is a taker in
default of appointment, each has a general power of appointment over one-half
of Blackacre (Rule z).
(v) As a variation on (iv), if A and B are both permissible appointees and
if B alone is the taker in default of appointment, Rule y (and not Rule z) ap-
parently applies. As a result, A does not have a general power of appointment
and the tax status of B is unaddressed.
(vi) As a further variation on (iv), if both A and B are permissible
appointees, and if A and B or the survivor of them is the taker in default of
appointment, the tax classification is unclear. At least arguably, Rule y applies
and neither A nor B has a general power of appointment.
Further variations could be posited, but enough has been said to indicate
the failings of the present system. We propose that this area be reexamined for
the purpose of developing a better rule or rules.
The application of Rule z illustrated in (iv) above is a useful starting point.
Because A and B, by cooperating, can divide Blackacre between them, they
are treated, in effect, as though they were tenants in common. That might be
made the universal rule, and takers in default of appointment, as well as per-
missible appointees, might be brought within that rule as, in effect, coowners.
The resulting rule would, at least, be simple as applied to an area in which
no rule, judged subjectively, can be perfect. Creators of powers who wish to
avoid the proposed rule can refrain from naming beneficiaries of the power
as holders thereof.
F. Interests owned in property subject to a nongeneral power of appointment
The possessor of a nongeneral power of appointment may also own an
interest (e.g., an estate for years or a vested remainder) in the appointive prop-
erty. The estate and gift tax regulations provide that if he exercises, releases,
or dies possessing that nontaxable power, he is considered to have made a tax-
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able transfer of his owned interest.40 As an example, assume that T was the
vested remainderman of a trust created by his mother; that he also had a limited
power of appointment over the trust property; and that he exercises that power,
thus divesting himself of the remainder. Under the regulations, he has made
a gift, for gift tax purposes, of the remainder.
The court decisions on this subject are in conflict.4'
Codification of the rule stated in the regulations (that there is a taxable
transfer of the owned interest) would eliminate uncertainty and potential fur-
ther litigation42
For reasons stated below (section 12H), an exception to the above proposal
should be made for transfers between spouses that do not qualify for the marital
deduction.
11. PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE ON THE LIFE OF THE DECEDENT (SECTION 2042)
The tax treatment of the life insurance industry and its products is, in part,
a political issue. There are also, however, issues of tax equity and efficiency
that require discussion.
Under current law and under the recommendations in the above section
9, the question is not whether proceeds of insurance on the life of the decedent
should be included in the gross estate, but, rather, the rules that should govern
such inclusion. This is not an easy (and has not been to the task force a
noncontroversial) subject, but, clearly, (a) escape from the current rules of in-
clusion of section 2042 is easy and (b) tracing problems made the former
premium-payment test for inclusion ineffective, controversial, and difficult to
administer.
We attach as Exhibit E, without recommendation, a study paper prepared
for our consideration, which discusses alternative approaches to estate tax treat-
ment of life insurance proceeds.43 However, our task force has failed to develop
a consensus on that subject.
In any event, we recommend that proceeds of insurance on the decedent's
life payable in installments to his surviving spouse for life and then to others
be brought within the QTIP marital deduction provisions. Like survivor benefits
(section 9, last paragraph), insurance proceeds should so qualify if payments
begin reasonably promptly after the insured's death and if all such payments
40 Regs. § 20.2041-1(b)(2); Regs. § 20.2041-3(o, examples (1) and (4); Regs. § 25.2514-1(b)(2). These regula-
tions are supported by the committee reports to the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951.
41 Compare Regester v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 1 (1984) (transfer of owned interest taxable), with Self v.
United States, 142 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. CI. 1956) (contra).
42 We recommend that where the owned interest is a remote or minor one, incapable of valuation, there
would be no gift tax.
43 The study paper reflects various individual views, but does not reflect the position of the task force
or of a majority of its members.
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during the life of the surviving spouse are payable to her or to a trust that qualifies
for the marital deduction. That would make it unnecessary for a decedent who
desires the marital deduction for insurance proceeds payable in installments
to arrange that payments made after the death of his surviving spouse be made
to her estate or to her appointees under a general power of appointment.
12. MARITAL DEDUCTION (SECTIONs 2044, 2056, 2519, AND 2533)
The marital deduction provisions should be modified in the following
respects:
A. Code sections 2056(b)(5) and 2523(e) should be repealed, thus elim-
inating the power-of-appointment trust as a separate category of interest quali-
fying for the marital deduction. 4 Power-of-appointment trusts should instead
be qualified for the marital deduction as QTIP trusts under Code section
2056(b)(7) or 2523(f) if the QTIP election is made. 45 To accommodate this pro-
posal, the definition of a QTIP trust should be changed to permit the donee
spouse or surviving spouse to be given a lifetime power (either general or limited)
to appoint out of the trust to third parties. Enactment of this and related pro-
posals would promote simplification and eliminate unneeded rules.
B. The above proposals (in sections 9 and 11) for qualification for the estate
tax QTIP marital deduction of survivor benefits and life insurance proceeds
would also permit, and make desirable, repeal of Code section 2056(b)(6).
C. In connection with the above changes, power-of-appointment marital
deduction trusts, etc., would, as regards the donee spouse or surviving spouse
or her estate, become taxable under Code sections 2044 and 2519, rather than
under sections 2041 and 2514.
D. Enactment of the above proposals A and B would subject power-of-
appointment marital trusts to the rules applicable to QTIP marital trusts. For
example, if the proposed regulations that would permit partial QTIP elections
to be made only for a fractional or percentile share of property (as distinguished
from a pecuniary amount) become effective, that rule would apply to power-
of-appointment marital trusts.
E. Enactment of the above proposals A and B should be accompanied by
enactment of a "grandfather" provision to protect Code section 2056(b)(5) or
(6) or 2523(e) dispositions already irrevocably in existence from the necessity
of making a QTIP election.
F The QTIP election should remain in the law, because it is a useful lifetime
44The so-called "estate trust" should be preserved as a separate category of interest qualifying for the
marital deduction, because that kind of trust permits income accumulation.
45Arguably, at least, if the change suggested in the next sentence of the text were made, every qualifying
power-of-appointment trust would also electively qualify as a QTIP trust without need for any other statutory
change.
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and post-mortem tax planning tool. The requirement that the estate tax QTIP
election be made on the return (including a delinquent, but first, return) should
be preserved. The requirement that a gift tax QTIP election is good only if
the gift tax return is filed by April 15 (or timely filed within a granted exten-
sion of time under section 1879(n) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986) should be
eliminated, so that the election can be made on a delinquent, but first, gift
tax return. (Although there is something to be said for providing no incentive
for delay, the estate tax rule seems, on balance, to be the better one.)
G. The harsh rule of section 2519 should be repealed, so that a QTIP trust
would not become wholly taxable upon any disposition of part of a qualifying
income interest. A substitute set of rules should be enacted that would proper-
ly treat (1) donations out of the income interest of the surviving spouse or donee
spouse and (2) exercise by such spouse of a lifetime power of appointment in
favor of another person. The problem in each situation is when the gift made
by the donee spouse or surviving spouse should be measured (1) by the prop-
erty given or appointed or (2) by an amount determined because such gift is
of an income interest, which appropriately should be capitalized (i.e., treated
as a gift of a corresponding portion of principal). The following suggestions,
which may not be comprehensive, are made:
(i) Assignment by the spouse of a fractional share of her income interest
for life would result in a gift of the assigned portion of the income interest
under section 2511 and of a corresponding fraction of principal under section
2519 as proposed to be revised.
(ii) If the trust has a charitable remainderman and the spouse assigns one-
third of her income interest to, say, her child, there would be no charitable
deduction for the one-third of the principal taxed under section 2519 as pro-
posed to be amended, because the trust is not a unitrust or annuity trust.4 6
(iii) Any assignment of income by the spouse for a period shorter than
her life should leave her taxable on the assigned income and, therefore, the
trust would remain taxable under section 2044 at her death. Section 2519 would
have no application.
(iv) Assume that the spouse remarries and assigns (say) one-third of her
income interest to her new husband. Under present law, neither the income
interest transferred to the new husband nor the remainder interest deemed under
Code section 2519 to be transferred to the trust remainderman qualifies for the
marital deduction. That should, we believe, remain the rule.
H. As a corollary to sections 2044 and 2519, property that passes to the
donee spouse or surviving spouse (herein "W") but does not qualify for the
46We do not intend to suggest that the unitrust and annuity trust rules enacted in 1969 could not be re-
placed with better alternatives; we note only that those rules do not permit a deduction in the above situation.
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marital deduction should be shielded from transfer tax in W's hands. That is
simply an application of the concept that the two spouses are, in effect, a tax-
able unit. Examples are given below:
(i) Assume that the amendments proposed in paragraphs A and B are made
and that no election is made to qualify for the marital deduction all or a fraction
of a trust that confers on W a general power of appointment. Because the property
so disqualified is a part of the taxable estate or taxable gifts of the deceased spouse
or donor spouse (herein "H"), it should not be taxed again to W or her estate.
(ii) Assume that the above amendments are made and that the will of H
divides his estate into Trust A, which qualifies for the marital deduction, and
Trust B, which does not so .qualify because no election is made. W has the
income for life from Trust B and a limited power to appoint property to others
from Trust B by deed. W appoints all such property to her son (S). Under the
rule discussed in section 10F above, W thus would make a gift of her life estate.
That gift should not be taxed because Trust B was part of H's taxable estate.
(iii) Assume that an interest in property passing from H to W does not
qualify for the marital deduction under the terminable interest rule. Taxation
to H should prevent taxation to W
I. The rule that possession by W of a nongeneral power of appointment
prevents a so-called "estate trust" from qualifying for the marital deduction
should be overruled by statute. Although the concept that such a power causes
such a trust to fall afoul of the terminable interest principle is technically cor-
rect, no valid tax policy is served by the rule, and it operates as a trap for the
unwary.
J. Many state laws confer on a widow the right to an allowance from the
corpus of the probate estate for her support. The Supreme Court has denied
the marital deduction for such allowances because they are terminable interests.4 7
We propose that such allowances be made eligible for the marital deduc-
tion if the widow survives long enough to receive the allowance. This proposed
new exception to the terminable interest rule is buttressed by considerations
similar to those that underlie existing exceptions (subparagraphs (A) and (B)
of Code section 2056(b)(3), which also turn on survival of the surviving spouse
for a limited period).
13. ADJUSTMENTS FOR GIFTS MADE WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DEATH
Subparagraphs (a), (b), and (d)(1) of Code section 2035 can be eliminated
as deadwood.
Paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of section 2035(d) are obscure. We recom-
47Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
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mend reexamination of the need for rules in this area, and the extent of such
need. After policy is reformulated, it should be expressed in comprehensible
language. See in that connection ABA Legislative Recommendation No. 1986-0,
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit F.
Section 2035(c) should be retained.
14. UNREALIZED GAINS AT DEATH
Concerns have been expressed regarding the basis rule of section 1014,
particularly its application to property qualifying for the marital deduction.
We note, however, the difficulty of developing a rule for marital transfers only
that would work under the community property and noncommunity property
systems and that would avoid the "floating basis" problem where the assets
of the probate estate are divided into marital and nonmarital shares. We note
also the record-keeping problem.
We attach as Exhibit G, without recommendation, a study paper on this
subject prepared for our consideration. 8 However, we have not been able to
reach a consensus on a solution to this problem.
15. GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
We have decided not to comment specifically on the generation-skipping
transfer tax, in view of the substantial revision of that tax in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 and the substantial study that others are giving to that revision.
We note with concern, however, the apparent subjection of direct skips to
simultaneous estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes with no provision
for deduction of either such tax from the base of the other.
16. TRANSFERS BY NONDOMICILED ALIENS
We note the growing investments by nondomiciled aliens in United States
property, and are concerned about the ineffectiveness of the transfer taxes in
that area, the ease of avoidance through incorporation, and the lack of con-
sistency between the gift and estate tax situs rules. Although we have formulated
no specific solution, and realize the difficulty of finding an effective one, we
recommend that the Treasury focus on possible legislation affecting that area.
17. VALUATION MATTERS
The following thoughts on valuation of property for transfer tax purposes
are submitted for consideration.
48The study paper reflects various individual views, but does not reflect the position of the task force
or of a majority of its members.
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A. Valuation generally
Code sections 2031(a) and 2512(a), each a single sentence, specify the date
of valuation of the gross estate and of a gift, respectively. The methods for
valuation of property are, appropriately, left to the estate and gift tax regula-
tions. Those regulations cover the subject of valuation comprehensively.
Code section 2031(b), which prescribes valuation of unlisted stocks or
securities by reference to comparables, is an aberration, and should be repealed
as unnecessary. There is no need for the statute to prescribe one of the general-
ly accepted valuation techniques. Repeal should not be taken to mean that com-
parables should not be used.
Code sections 2032 and 2032A, relating respectively to alternate valua-
tion and farm and business real property valuation, are of a different character.
They prescribe substantive departures from what would otherwise be the valua-
tion rules. In our opinion, those sections serve useful purposes, and should
be retained. We would like to see section 2032A simplified, but we have no
specific recommendation.
B. Effect of decedent's death on valuation
Generally, effect is given to the fact of the decedent's death in valuing his
interests in property includible in the gross estate under Code section 2033.
Examples are given below:
(i) A conferred interest in property that is extinguished by the decedent's
death is not included in his gross estate.4 9 For instance, if the decedent's father
devised Blackacre to the decedent for life with remainder to the decedent's son,
no interest in Blackacre is included in the decedent's gross estate.
(ii) Where the decedent was a key man in a business, the value of his in-
terest therein is reduced to reflect the loss of his ability, activity, or good will .O
(iii) The decedent's interest in a business that owned insurance on his life
is valued by including in its assets the insurance proceeds, rather than the pre-
death value of the policy.5'
(iv) Where the decedent's death terminated a contractual restriction under
which the decedent's partners might acquire the decedent's interest in the part-
nership at a discount from fair market value, the decedent's partnership in-
terest was includible in his gross estate at full value.52
49See, e.g., Helvering v. Rhodes' Estate, 117 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Rosser, 64 F.2d
631 (3d Cir. 1933). The issue in these cases was whether the decedent had a fee or merely a life interest;
it was accepted that the life interest would not fall into the gross estate.
10 E.g., Newell v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1933).
"E.g., Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
913 (1959).
52 United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
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(v) Death benefits under employment contracts were included in the gross
estate without regard to the possibility that the decedent might have forfeited
the right to the benefits by terminating the employment relationship during life.53
(vi) A survivor's annuity under a joint and survivor annuity contract was
valued without any reference to the deceased annuitant's life expectancy.54
We subscribe to the results in the above cases. A different situation is
presented, however, where the decedent, during life, entered into arrangements
under which the nature of his property interest is diminished at his death. The
following such arrangements have come to our attention.
(i) In a recent Tax Court memorandum decision,55 the decedent owned
a 77.8% limited interest in a family partnership. He had the election, while
alive, to dissolve the partnership. The parties stipulated in the Tax Court that
the decedent would have received $59.6 million for his interest if he had exer-
cised his election, but that the value of his interest immediately after his death
(when there was no such election) was only $33 million. The Tax Court found
a $33 million value.
(ii) Two relatively recent technical advice memoranda5 6 addressed situa-
tions in which the decedent owned at his death shares in a family-owned cor-
poration that represented voting control. In both cases, the certificate of incor-
poration provided that the decedent's shares would become nonvoting at his
death.57 The Service held in both cases that the decedent's voting control should
be taken into account in valuing his stock for estate tax purposes.
(iii) We have considered the not uncommon situation in which, for exam-
ple, the decedent owned all of the voting stock of a corporation and, by his
will, left one-third of that stock to each of his three children.
In general, the view of our task force is that, in situations such as those
described, the value of the decedent's partnership interest or stock should be
determined by taking into account the powers (e.g., to dissolve the partnership
or to exercise voting control over the corporation) that he retained until his
death58
53Goodman v. Granger, 243 F2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1957).
54Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner,-129 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1942).
"Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, T.C.M. (P-H) 87,007 (1987).
S6T.A.M. 8510002, Nov. 26, 1984; T.A.M. 8401006, Sept. 28, 1983.
17In T.A.M. 8510002, a son of the decedent had voting control immediately after the decedent's death.
In Technical Advice Memorandum 8401006, the decedent's death caused voting power to be divided among
his wife, five children, and a trust, no one of which had voting control.
8In recommending the above approach to valuation of stock held by the decedent until his death, we
are not suggesting that stock given away during life should be brought into the gross estate because of
retention of voting power. See supra section 7B, Rule e.
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C. Treasury proposal on valuation of fractional interests
In its 1984 report to the President on tax reform, the Treasury Department
proposed a special valuation rule for transfers of fractional interests in proper-
ty.59 In valuing the interest transferred, that interest would be aggregated with
other fractional interests in the same property previously given away by the
transferor and any such fractional interest retained by him. For that purpose,
any fractional interest owned by the transferor's spouse would be attributed to
the transferor. The result of such aggregation might be to eliminate a discount
for a fractional interest or, in the case of voting stock, to create a control
premium.
We have had difficulty in evaluating this proposal. Its application to various
fact patterns is unclear. We have considered a variety of potential applications,
sometimes in agreement and at other times in disagreement, which we sum-
marize below. We have taken as a basic pattern a case in which H (or H and
his wife) owns or originally owned 60% of the stock of corporation X (all of
which is voting) and B, an unrelated individual, owns the other 40%.
(i) H, the owner of 60% of the X stock, gives his son (S) 20% in year
1, 20% in year 4, and dies in year 7 bequeathing S 20%.
(ii) Same as (i), except that in each such year H transfers 10% to S and
10% to E's daughter (D).
(iii) Same as (i) or (ii), except that the 60% stock interest is community
property, one-half owned by H's wife (W).60
(iv) Same as (i), except that H, two years prior to year 1, gave W one-half
the stock as a marital deduction gift. H and W separately thereafter made the
gifts described in (i).
(v) Same as (iv), except that the gift by H two years prior to year 1 was
to a QTIP trust for W There were no subsequent gifts. H died owning 30%,
and 30% is later taxed to W under Code section 2044.
(vii) Same as (iii), with the addition that H, by his will, bequeathed his
30% stock interest to Was trustee for the benefit of their children. At W's subse-
quent death she owns 30% of the stock outright and holds 30% as trustee.
(viii) Same as (i), except that H, owning 60% at death, bequeaths it to
his children (Si, S2, and D) for life, with remainder to their respective descen-
dants per stirpes. Alternatively, (a) there is one trust, which will not terminate
until the death of the survivor of S1, S2, and D; (b) there are three separate
trusts, which will terminate at their respective deaths; (c) the three separate
"See TREASURY, supra note 11, at 387.
60 The interests of H and Ware not now aggregated. Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th
Cir. 1981); Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978).
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trusts have the same trustee; (d) the three separate trusts have different trustees.
(ix) Same as (vii), except that H bequeaths one-third of his stock to each
of S1, S2, and D. Thereafter, each of S1, S2, and D make gifts of the stock
to their respective children.
We assume that the Treasury would propose to find a control premium
in each of (i) through (vi). Presumably, the death of one spouse would eliminate
subsequent aggregation. There would be no aggregation for the gifts by S1, S2,
and D in (ix), and therefore, not in (viii)(d). The Treasury has not addressed
(vii) or (viii)(a) through (c).
On most, but not all, of the hypotheticals we have presented, our views
are divided.
We have a number of observations:
(i) Our members who are familiar with the community property system
understand that the result approved in Bright and Lee61 is routinely applied
in audits of community property estates. In other words, the interests of H and
Ware not aggregated in valuing the interest of the deceased spouse. If, for ex-
ample, H and W each owns 50 % of the voting stock of a corporation, the first
of them to die is not treated as having had voting control.
(ii) The Bright case was decided en banc with the aid of briefs amicus
curiae filed by leading members of the Texas tax bar. The opinion, after review-
ing in detail the existing case law, concluded that the interests of H and W had
traditionally not been, and should not be, aggregated for valuation purposes
in either community property or common law jurisdictions.
(iii) There are happy families and unhappy families. The former may, for
a time at least, act in concert and thus realize the values that would be found
under the Treasury proposal. The latter often will not; we are all familiar with
the bitter strife and litigation in which unhappy families can engage. For them
the valuation process proposed by the Treasury could be ruinous because the
tax would be exacted on values they would not realize.
(iv) Assume that closely-held corporation X is worth $90x, of which $30x
is the value of voting control. Assume further that A, who owns all the stock
of X, gives 1/3 of the stock to his son (S) in year 1, 1/3 in year 4, and 1/3 in
year 7. Because the second gift shifts voting control from A to S, the three gifts
might logically be valued, in order of time, at $20x, $50x, and $20x. We ques-
tion whether the Treasury's proposal to value them at $30x, $30x, and $30x
is superior.
(v) If the Treasury's proposal is adopted, then our task force's proposal,
in the preceding subsection B, to value at death the retained voting control in
61 See cases cited supra note 60; see also supra note 57.
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the situations covered by the two cited technical advice memoranda would have
to be reconsidered. Otherwise there would be double taxation of a portion of
the value of voting control.
(vi) We have had difficulty in deciding whether situations such as that in
T. A.M. 8401006, where no one succeeds to the decedent's voting control, should
result in lower values than situations such as that in T.A.M. 8510002, where
voting control shifts from the decedent to another. The Treasury has not
specifically addresed that question.
(vii) We are unable to determine how the Treasury intended to determine
when two classes of stock would be aggregated or segregated. For example,
did the Treasury intend to accept the result in Estate of Curry v. United States,62
in which the decedent's voting (53% of the vote) and nonvoting shares were
given the same value per share?
(viii) In conclusion, we urge that new rules in this important area should
not be proposed lightly. The subject should be given careful study and analysis.
There should be an opportunity for public comment and hearings.
D. Estate freezes; buy-sell agreements
Other techniques that are used to reduce values for estate tax purposes are
intra-family estate freezes and buy-sell agreements. These are also areas that
might be addressed in regulations that would discourage the use of such ar-
rangements for what are, essentially, substitutes for testamentary disposition.
This does not mean that such arrangements should not be permitted where they
conform to economic reality.
In view of the permissiveness with which the Service has policed these
areas, consideration should be given to making any new rules that are embodied
in the suggested regulations prospective only.
E. Advance valuation determinations
We recommend that the Treasury consider proposing enactment of a pro-
cedure for pre-transaction or pre-trial valuation of property by a panel of valua-
tion experts. For pre-trial valuation, the taxpayer might be permitted to elect
that valuation procedure within 90 days after the institution of the court
proceeding.
18. DEADWOOD
The time has come to eliminate from the Code: section 2036(c); the ex-
pression "after September 7, 1916," in section 2037(a); the parenthetical ex-
pression in section 2037(a)(2); section 2038(a)(2) and the title of section
2038(a)(1); the expression "entered into after March 3, 1931" in section 2039(a);
section 2041(a)(1); and all references to date of the creation of the power in
62706 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir. 1983).
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section 2041(a)(2) or 2041(b). 63
In connection with the above repeals, a saving clause in the repealing act
could preserve any existing tax benefits that would otherwise be lost.
19. OTHER SUBJECTS
We list below, with limited comments, other transfer tax subjects that our
timetable did not permit us to examine adequately, but that, in our opinion,
may require attention. They are:
A. Code sections 303 and 6166. (We note one argument in favor of reten-
tion of section 303, i.e., that it provides a degree of neutrality among
various business forms.)
B. Whether use of the exemption or credit should be discretionary. (See
in this connection ABA Legislative Recommendation No. 1980-5, a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit H.)
C. Estate tax apportionment, including whether and the extent to which
there should be federal rules and whether, if so, they should be man-
datory. (See in this connection our relevant comment in section 9 above.)
D. The prior transfers credit.
E. Code Section 691, including Treasury I proposals.
F. The election to take administration expenses as income tax deductions.
G. Deductibility of interest for estate tax purposes, including Treasury I
proposals.
H. ESOPs (Code sections 2057 and 2210).
I. The new 15% additional estate tax on excess accumulations under
employee plans. (Code section 4981A(d).)
J. Code section 2504(c), including the desirability of making it applicable
to the estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes. (See in this con-
nection the attached Exhibit H.)
K. The transfer tax charitable deduction provisions.
L. Code section 6163. (One commentator notes that the differential be-
tween the initially fixed interest rate used for discounting remainders
and the floating interest rates on tax deficiencies flaws the operation
of this provision.)
Respectfully submitted,
K. Jay Holdsworth, Chair
Ronald D. Aucutt
Edward B. Benjamin, Jr.
Kenneth W. Bergen
James B. Lewis
63 Some commentators on this suggestion state that there are still too many pre-October 22, 1942 powers
of appointment to make the proposed streamlining of section 2041 desirable. We are not persuaded.
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EXHIBIT A
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
Nov. 19, 1985
Hugh Calkins
Chairman, Section of Taxation
American Bar Association
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Hugh:
As you know, the Treasury Department's November 1984 report to the Presi-
dent, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, included
several recommendations for the reform and simplification of the Federal transfer
tax system. In commenting on these recommendations, a number of profes-
sional groups and interested individuals expressed general support for the im-
provement and simplification of the transfer tax system, but also expressed con-
cern that any transfer tax recommendations included in the Administration's
fundamental tax reform proposals would be overshadowed by other issues and
thus would receive inadequate study and consideration.
Primarily in response to these concerns, the President's Tax Proposals to
the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity omitted any recommenda-
tions for the reform or simplification of the Federal transfer tax. The Treasury
Department remains interested, however,, in continuing efforts to reform the
transfer tax system. In this regard, we hope to work with practitioners in develop-
ing proposals to make the present system fairer and simpler.
Using the Treasury Department's November recommendations as the start-
ing point for discussion, we would solicit your recommendations for the
simplification and improvement of the Federal transfer tax. In general, we would
like to focus attention on the issues raised in the Treasury's November 1984
proposals; however, it is not our intention to preclude the consideration of other
proposals to improve and simplify the system. Accordingly, in addition to your
comments on the Treasury proposals, we are anxious to see your suggestions
for improvements in the system.
With respect to certain of the proposals, some specific comments may help
to focus the efforts of your group:
* Unification of Estate and Gift Taxes - We recognize the argument that the
basis step-up for transfers at death precludes true parity between lifetime
gifts and bequests. However, section 1015 provides a basis increase for
the gift tax attributable to the appreciation in the property transferred;
since the Treasury proposal contemplates that gifts in the top bracket
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would be subject to a transfer tax equal to the amount received by the
donee, all gifts in the top bracket would receive a full basis step-up to
fair market value.
* Powers of Appointment - Present law's "ascertainable standard" creates
a trap for the poorly advised. The Treasury proposal sought to eliminate
this trap by providing a more liberal standard (similar to the current test
under § 678 for determining whether a beneficiary is the owner of a
trust for federal income tax purposes). Other suggestions have included
(i) providing a disclaimer or reformation procedure for standards that
are overly broad, and/or (ii) retaining current law for powers that are
exercisable alone (or with a spouse) while removing the "adverse in-
terest" rule so that any power exercisable only with the consent of a
co-trustee (other than the spouse) would not be treated as a general power
of appointment.
* Retained Powers and Interests/Effective Date - We would expect that
any new rules would not apply to existing, irrevocable trust arrangements.
* Transfers of Fractional Interests - Our premises are that (i) the value
of an asset for transfer tax purposes should be its value in the hands of
the transferor, and (ii) the transfer of a single interest in property in two
or more separate transactions should not present opportunities for transfer
tax avoidance. Current law gives rise to such opportunities by permit-
ting a minority discount for fractional transfers of an interest in a business
entity or other asset, even though the discount would not be available
upon a transfer of the entire interest. The original Treasury proposal
sought to correct this problem with a straightforward, proportional rule.
We are aware that if such a rule is adopted, close attention will need
to be paid to the proper scope of the attribution rules.
* Generation-Skipping Transfers - Treasury's April 1983 Proposal to
Simplify and Improve the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax System
antedates the current tax reform effort, and we remain committed to its
enactment as a replacement for current Chapter 13.
* Payment of Estate Tax in Installments - Our primary objective is to
simplify the system. In addition, repeal of the special 4-percent interest
rate and disallowance of the estate tax deduction for interest on estate
tax may permit enactment of a relatively liberal rule allowing install-
ment payment for a broad class of illiquid estates. Careful attention should
be given to the so-called acceleration rule.
To provide adequate time for all interested groups and individuals to re-
spond to these issues, we will continue to accept comments through May 1986.
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We hope to develop a set of recommendations that will enjoy broad support
among practitioners. We look forward to working with your group to that end.
Sincerely yours,
Ronald A. Pearlman
Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy)
EXHIBIT B
ARTICLE XIII
I devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue, and remainder of my proper-
ty and estate which I own or to which I am in any manner entitled at the time
of my death, both real and personal, wherever situated, whether acquired before
or after the execution of this will, including lapsed and disclaimed devises and
bequests, but not including any property over which I may have a power of
appointment (which power or powers of appointment I hereby expressly decline
to exercise), as follows:
A. If my wife Mary Doe survives me, to her, absolutely and in fee sim-
ple, my entire residuary estate, or, if it is less than my entire residuary estate,
an amount (undiminished by any payment of taxes pursuant to the preceding
Article of this will) equal in value to the smallest marital deduction which must
be allowed to my estate so that after taking into account all other allowable
deductions, the unified credit, and the credit for state death taxes (except to
the extent that use of the credit for state death taxes would result in an increase
in the amount of such taxes paid) my estate is not subject to federal estate tax
(disregarding any tax that might be imposed with respect to any excess retire-
ment accumulation under section 4981A(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986), less the value of all property and interests in property which are not
a part of my residuary estate, but which are finally allowed to my estate as
a marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes. For the purposes of this
paragraph A, the values of the assets included in my gross estate shall be those
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. Elections made by my per-
sonal representative with respect to alternate valuation dates and with respect
to deductions for estate tax or income tax purposes shall determine the aforesaid
values and the amount of this devise and bequest. My personal representative
shall satisfy this devise and bequest with cash and other property fairly represen-
tative of the net appreciation or depreciation, from the date of my death to the
date of distribution, in the values of the properties available for distribution,
but my personal representative shall not use for the satisfaction of this devise
and bequest any property which does not qualify for the marital deduction for
federal estate tax purposes or (except to the extent that other property is insuf-
ficient) any property which when distributed to my wife is subject to any estate,
inheritance, succession, or other death tax payable to any foreign country.
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B. The balance of my residuary estate, if any, or if my wife Mary Doe
fails to survive me, my entire residuary estate, absolutely and in fee simple,
to my descendants who survive me, per stirpes, or, if no descendants of mine
survive me, half to those persons who survive me who would be entitled to
distribution of my personal property and half to those persons who survive
me who would be entitled to distribution of my wife's personal property (both
in the proportions that they would be entitled to such distributions) if she and
I died simultaneously (at the time of my death) without wills, as provided by
the laws of the State of in effect at the time I sign this will. If,
however, any amount is thereby distributable to a descendant of mine who at
that time has not attained the age of thirty years, that amount shall not be
distributed to that descendant, but shall be distributed to the trustee, hereinafter
named, in trust, to be held, administered, and distributed by the trustee in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article VI of this will.
EXHIBIT C
ABA LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION NO. 1958-11
APPLICATION OF ANNUAL GIFT TAX EXCLUSION
TO CERTAIN GIFTS OF FUTURE INTERESTS
Resolved, That the American Bar Association recommends to the Congress
that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 be amended to allow the $3,000 annual
gift tax exclusion with respect to any gift where the donee is identifiable, even
though possession and enjoyment of the gift by such donee may be postponed
until a future time; and
Be It Further Resolved, That the Association proposes that this result be
effected by amending section 2503(c) of the 1954 Code; and
Be It Further Resolved, That the Section of Taxation be directed to urge
the following amendment or its equivalent in purpose and effect upon the proper
committees of Congress.
Sec. 1. Section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is amended
to read as follows (eliminate matter struck through and insert new matter
in italics):
(c) **[TRANSFER FOR THE BENEFIT OF MINOR]** CERTAIN
TRANSFERS NOT CONSIDERED FUTURE INTERESTS - No part of a gift
**[to an individual who has not attained the age of 21 years on the date of such
transfer]** shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property for pur-
poses of subsection (b) if the property and the income therefrom will, to the
extent not distributed to or expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee during
his life, be payable on his death either to his estate, or as he may appoint under
a general power of appointment as defined in section 2514(c).
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**[(I) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee before his
attaining the age of 21 years; and
(2) will to the extent not so expended
(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21 years
be payable to the estate of the donee or as he may appoint under
a general power of appointment as defined in section 2514(c).]**
Sec. 2. Effective Date. This amendment shall be applicable to all gifts made
subsequent to the date of its enactment.
EXPLANATION
Summary
This will grant the annual $3,000 gift tax exclusion to all gifts of future
interests (to both minors and adults) where the property will be used solely
for the benefit of a specified donee during his life and the remainder of the
property, if any, will on his death, be included in his gross estate. Section 2503(c)
of the 1954 Code (the so-called gifts to minors provision) will be amended to
eliminate the present requirement for distribution to the donee at age 21 and
to permit a gift-over to third persons should the donee die prior to termination
of the interest.
DISCUSSION
Criticism of § 2503(c) has been directed mainly to its requirement for com-
plete distribution at age 21 and to the impossibility of providing for a gift-over
to a third person upon the minor's death prior to termination. Congress has
told us that the original purpose of the future interest exception to the annual
exclusion was the "apprehended difficulty, in many instances, of determining
the number of eventual donees and the values of their respective gifts." This
policy can be preserved, however, so long as the property given to a donee
will be used by or for him alone during his life and will be subject to federal
estate tax at his death. It should not be material when the donee will receive
the benefit from the property or who will receive it after his death.
Under this approach the donor could provide for termination at any par-
ticular age or even run the trust through the donee's entire lifetime. He could
(but need not) provide for gifts-over to third persons on the donee's death, so
long as the property was includible in the donee's gross estate. Minor and adult
donees would thus be treated alike.
The proposal would apply to gifts whether outright to, or in trust for the
benefit of, the donee and whether the donee is a minor or an adult.
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It is not intended that this amendment provide an exclusive method of
creating a present interest. Nor is it intended to affect the application of the
annual exclusion to outright gifts, whether or not the donee is under disabilities
arising under local law by reason of minority or otherwise. No retroactive appli-
cation is sought.
EXHIBIT D
ABA LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION NO. 1970-5
TO AMEND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
TO CLARIFY THE EXTENT OF INCLUSION
IN THE GROSS ESTATE OF TRANSFERS
MADE FOR INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION.
Resolved, That the American Bar Association recommends to the Congress
that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 be amended to clarify the rule for deter-
mining the extent of inclusion in the gross estate of lifetime transfers made for
sufficient consideration; and
Further Resolved, That the Association proposes that this result be effected
by amending section 2043(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; and
Further Resolved, That the Section of Taxation is directed to urge the follow-
ing amendment, or its equivalent in purpose and effect, upon the proper
committees of Congress:
Sec. 1. Section 2043(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is amended
to read as follows (eliminate matter struck through and insert new matter
in italics):
(a) IN GENERAL - If any **[one of the transfers, trusts, interests, rights
or powers enumerated and]** transfer of an interest in property, as described
in sections 2035 to 2038 inclusive, **[and section 2041 is made, created, exer-
cised, or relinquished,]** was made for a consideration in money or money's
worth, but **[is]** was not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth, there shall be included in the gross estate
only the excess of **[the fair market value at the time of death of the property
otherwise to be included on account of such transaction, over the value of the
consideration received therefor by the decedent]**:
(1) the value of such interest otherwise to be included in the gross estate
over
(2) an amount equal to the same proportion of such value as the con-
sideration in money or money's worth received by the decedent bore to
the value of the interest on the date of transfer.
The lifetime exercise or release of a power of appointment as described
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in section 2041 (a) shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be treated as
a transfer of the property with respect to which such power of appointment
was exercised or released.
Sec. 2. This amendment shall apply to estates of decedents dying after the
date of enactment thereof.
EXPLANATION
Summary
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide that a transfer of an
interest in property made during life for partial consideration and otherwise
includible in the gross estate shall be included by ascertaining the proportion
of the interest that was transferred donatively and applying that proportion to
the value of the interest at the estate tax valuation date.
DISCUSSION
Sections 2035 to 2038, inclusive, and 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code
provide that the value of interests in property transferred by the decedent dur-
ing his life, or the value of property with respect to which he exercised or released
a general power of appointment during life, shall be included in the decedent's
gross estate if the transfer, exercise or release meets certain tests. Each of these
sections provides an exception in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth. Section 2043(a) provides that
if any such includible transfer, exercise or release is made for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth, there shall be includ-
ed in the gross estate only the excess of the value otherwise to be included
over the value of the consideration received.
The courts have generally held that section 2043(a) requires that the trans-
ferred interest be valued as of one date (the estate tax valuation date) and the
consideration as of another date (the date of transfer). Vardell's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 307 F2d 688, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Past, 347
F.2d 7, 14 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Righter, 400 F2d 344 (8th Cir.
1968); United States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332, 344, n.19 (5th Cir. 1969); Estate
of Lillian B. Gregory, 39 T.C. 1012, 1020-22 (1963); Estate of Howard Lee Davis,
51 T.C. 269, 280-82 (1968); Estate of Dora N. Marshall, 51 T.C. 696, 703 (1968).
A proportional approach to measurement of the estate tax value of the
bargain element of the lifetime transfer would be fairer and is the aim of the
proposed legislation. To compare the two approaches, assume that the dece-
dent, in contemplation of his death, sold property worth $500,000 to his son
for $200,000, and that the property sold was worth $750,000 on the estate tax
valuation date. The cited court decisions would require the property to be in-
cluded in the gross estate to the extent of $550,00U ($750,000 less $200,000).
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The legislative proposal would require inclusion of $450,000 ($750,000 multiplied
by 60 percent, that having been the percentage of the transfer that was donative).
A further anomaly of the present approach is that classification of a transfer
as one made for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth
is determined by reference to values at the time of the transfer. Thus, if the
decedent, during his lifetime, transferred Blackacre to his son in exchange for
Whiteacre, no amount would be includable in his gross estate under present
law if the values of the two properties were equal at the time of the exchange
(thus disregarding any subsequent increase in the value of Blackacre). However,
if Blackacre exceeded Whiteacre in value by $100 at the time of the exchange,
any increase in the value of Blackacre up to the estate tax valuation date would
form a part of the gross estate. The legislative proposal would eliminate this
notch feature of the present law.
The legislative proposal may either decrease or increase the extent of inclu-
sion in the gross estate of a lifetime transfer for a partial consideration, de-
pending upon whether the transferred interest rises or falls in value between
the date of transfer and the estate tax valuation date.
Although the legislative proposal will apply only to estates of decedents
dying after the date of its enactment, it will apply to lifetime transfers made
on or before the date of enactment by an individual who dies after that date.
The legislative proposal is not intended to change present law in any way
other than by substitution of the proportional formula for the formula established
by the cited cases. Although the language of section 2043(a) has been recast
to simplify the introduction of the proportional formula, no inference should
be drawn that the categories of transactions to which section 2043(a) applies
have been either broadened or narrowed. The rules for classifying wholly
gratuitous transfers, exercises or releases as includable in or excludable from
the gross estate must be drawn from sections 2035 to 2038, inclusive, and 2041,
which are not amended by the legislative proposal. The only function of sec-
tion 2043(a) is to make such rules, which are applicable pro toto to wholly
gratuitous transfers, exercises and releases, applicable only pro tanto to transfers,
exercises and releases for inadequate consideration.
This recommendation was prepared by the Section's Committee on Estate
and Gift Taxes. The proposed legislation is of general application. To the best
of the knowledge and belief of the chairman of the committee, no member of
the committee has a personal interest in the proposed legislation.
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EXHIBIT E
NOTE: This study paper reflects various individual views, but does not
reflect the position of the task force or of a majority of its members.
Study Paper on Transfer Tax Treatment Of Life Insurance
This study paper, submitted to the task force on transfer tax restructuring,
summarizes the debate over the transfer tax treatment of life insurance, presents
a historical sketch, outlines the relevant rules of the present transfer tax statutes,
comments on the task force proposal regarding Code section 2039, and outlines
possible substitute transfer tax rules for life insurance.
The debate
The argument on one side is that life insurance is an investment and
should be treated, for transfer tax purposes, like other investments. That
argument was cited by Congress in 1954, in connection with its repeal of the
premium-payment test for inclusion in the gross estate of proceeds of insurance
on the decedent's life. This argument is for tax neutrality, so that the choice
between insurance and other investments would be made solely with regard
to factors other than taxes.
The argument on the other side is that life insurance is inherently testa-
mentary and, as such, fair game for the estate tax. Life insurance differs from
other investments because the event of death directly affects the nature and value
of the insurance. That and other peculiarities make unrealistic the argument
that the transfer tax rules applicable to other investments should apply to life
insurance. Present law recognizes that fact in prescribing special estate tax rules
for life insurance. Moreover, if, as some assert, one purpose of the estate tax
is to reach accumulations of property that have escaped income taxation, the
income tax exclusion of life insurance proceeds provided by Code section 101
is a further reason for subjecting such proceeds to estate tax.
Proponents of the first argument point to whole-life policies, which com-
bine savings and insurance elements. Proponents of the second argument point
to term policies, which are pure insurance.
Other points have been made by advocates of the first side of the argu-
ment. Citing the view of some that life insurance is not a relatively attractive
investment as a financial matter, they give that as an added reason why it should
not be discriminated against for transfer tax purposes. They cite also the social
value of encouraging the carrying of life insurance for the protection of widows
and orphans. The advocates of the second side of the argument say that the
first point is irrelevant and that the second has little significance for a system
of estate taxation that reaches only estates of more than $600,000.
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The debate is a stand-off, at least in the sense that neither side has ac-
cepted as persuasive the arguments of the other.
History
The original version of the modern estate tax law, enacted in 1916, did not
specifically mention life insurance. The 1918 amendment defined the gross estate
to include the proceeds of insurance "taken out" by the decedent upon his own
life, but exempted the first $40,000 of such proceeds receivable by beneficiaries
other than the executor.
The statute did not explain what was meant by insurance "taken out" by
the insured decedent. The regulations focused at times on premium payment
and at others on incidents of ownership in the policy as the relevant test. That
administrative vacillation received uncertain judicial support.
In 1942 the $40,000 insurance exemption and the "taken out" approach
were eliminated. The gross estate was redefined to include proceeds of insurance
on the decedent's life:
1. Receivable by his executor, without further qualification; and
2. Receivable by other beneficiaries, but only if -
a. Attributable to premium payments made by the decedent (with
an exemption where he had transferred the policy during life for con-
sideration), or
b. The decedent possessed any incident of ownership (not including
a reversionary interest) in the policy, exercisable alone or with another.
In 1954 the premium-payment test for inclusion was eliminated, and the
incidents-of-ownership test was enlarged to include a five-percent or greater
reversionary interest.
In 1978, and again in 1981, Code ssection 2035 was amended to address
specifically the payment of premiums or transfer of a life insurance policy within
three years preceding death.
The gift tax statute has never prescribed special rules for life insurance.
Present Law
As indicated immediately above, the gift tax statute does not attempt to
treat life insurance differently from other property. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, premium payments, policy assignments, or irrevocable designa-
tions of beneficiary may be gifts, either by the insured or by someone else.
The test, as for other property, is whether the donor has relinquished dominion
and control.
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The estate tax statute contains several rules relating to life insurance
proceeds:
1. Under Code section 2042(1), proceeds of insurance on the decedent's
life are includible in his gross estate if they are receivable by his executor.
2. Under Code section 2042(2), proceeds of insurance on the decedent's
life receivable by persons other than his executor are includible in the dece-
dent's gross estate if the decedent had at his death any incident of ownership
(including a five-percent or greater reversionary interest) in the policy, exer-
cisable either alone or with another.
3. Code section 2035 contains some references to transfers with respect
to life insurance policies made within three years of death. The current rules
for such transfers are not clear.
4. Code section 2039 specifically excludes life insurance from its amoit,
thus precluding any dominance of section 2039 over section 2042.
5. Code sections 2033, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2040, and 2041 do not contain
any specific exclusion for life insurance. It may be argued that sections 2035
and 2042, which refer specifically to life insurance, are exclusive, but the validity
of that argument is uncertain.
6. Insurance proceeds includible in the insured's gross estate and passing
to his surviving spouse qualify for the estate tax marital deduction. Code sec-
tion 2056(b)(6) qualifies for that deduction certain insurance proceeds held by
the insurer for the benefit of the surviving spouse and her appointees.
7. Insurance proceeds qualifying for the marital deduction are, to the
extent not consumed by the surviving spouse, taxable at her subsequent
death or her lifetime gift thereof. That tax is, in effect, a surrogate for the
tax eliminated by the marital deduction. The result is to tax the insurance
proceeds in that situation.
Task force recommendation regarding section 2039
Tested by their titles, at least, section 2039 applies to annuities and sec-
tion 2042 to life insurance. Those two types of life insurance company prod-
udts differ in that annuities reward long life and life insurance compensates
for early death.
However, the task force proposal for amendment of section 2039 would
bring within that section pure death or survivor benefits that serve purposes
similar to those of life insurance, and would apply to those benefits tests stricter
than those supplied by section 2042 for life insurance proceeds. Specifically,
section 2039 would apply even though the decedent had at his death no inci-
dent of ownership in the contract providing the death or survivor benefits.
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Proposals
It cannot seriously be argued that the above estate tax rules treat life in-
surance like other investments. Those rules look in part to destination of pro-
ceeds, in part to the decedent's rights in the policy, and in part to time of transfer.
In some respects they are tighter than the rules applicable to other investments
and in others more liberal.
The proposals below, without attempting to resolve the policy disagreement
summarized earlier, outline for consideration other possible transfer tax rules.
Proposal A
1. The present section 2042(1) would be retained and the present section
2042(2) repealed.
2. Section 2042 would be amended to provide that proceeds of insurance
on the life of the decedent would be included in his gross estate if the proceeds
are receivable by his spouse, his ancestors, his descendants, the spouse of any
such descendant, or the estate of any such individual. For that purpose, rela-
tionship by adoption would not be distinguished from relationship by birth.
The identity of the payor of the premiums would be irrelevant.
3. Proceeds of insurance on the life of the decedent receivable by entities
other than estates (corporations, partnerships, and trusts) would be treated
as follows:
(a) For the purpose of valuing the decedent's interest, for estate tax
purposes, in any such entity, effect would be given to the decedent's
death, i.e., the value of the proceeds would be counted. (To avoid duplica-
tion in values, that portion of the insurance proceeds would not, as such,
be included in the gross estate.)
(b) With respect to any interst in any such entity of any individual
or estate described in paragraph 2, a corresponding portion of the pro-
ceeds of the insurance would be included in the insured's gross estate.
(This rule is necessary to prevent abuse by creation of entities.)
4. During the insured's life, premium payments or policy assignments would
not be gifts, but the surrender of a policy for cash by an owner described in
paragraph 2 would be deemed to be a gift of the cash so received. That gift
would be deemed to have been made by the insured to the recipient.
5. Proceeds of insurance on the life of the decedent payable in installments
to his surviving spouse for life and then to others would be brought within
the QTIP marital deduction.
Examples illustrating application of the above rules are given below (in
each case the insured individual is I):
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Example (1). Insurance on the life of I was taken out by his daughter (D).
D received the proceeds on I's death. The proceeds would be includible in
I's gross estate.
Example (2). 1 is the chief executive of a large, publicly-owned corpora-
tion (C). C has taken out a "key-man" insurance policy on I's life. I owns three
percent of the outstanding stock of C. Upon I's death, (a) no part of the in-
surance proceeds, as such, is includible in his gross estate, and (b) his C stock
is valued in the usual manner (mean between high and low sales prices on the
date of death or alternate valuation date). (No adjustment to date-of-death value
for the receipt of the insurance proceeds would be appropriate, because the
effect on stock market price would not be significant.)
Example (3). 1 was one of four equal shareholders of a corporation (C).
C has a "key-man" insurance policy on I's life. The other three shareholders
were individuals, none of whom was related to I as described in paragraph 2.
On I's death, (a) none of the insurance proceeds, as such, would be includible
in his gross estate and (b) his 25 percent stock interest in C would be valued
by counting the insurance proceeds as a part of C's assets.
Example (4). The facts are the same as in Example (3) except that one
of the three other equal shareholders of C was I's son (S). The results are the
same as in Example (3) except that one-fourth of the insurance proceeds (cor-
responding to S's interest in C), is includible, as such, in I's gross estate.
One consequence of enactment of Proposal A would be that the gross estate
could include the proceeds of insurance neither owned nor purchased by the
decedent. The apportionment rules of Code section 2206 would, unless made
inapplicable by the will of the insured decedent, prevent the resulting estate
tax burden from falling on persons other than the recipient of the insurance
proceeds. If the rules outlined above were adopted, consideration might be given
to making section 2206 mandatory.
Variations on Proposal A
Critics of Proposal A note that it (1) would subject to estate tax the pro-
ceeds of insurance on the decedent's life purchased by a child of the decedent
(or other member of the decedent's family) with money never received from
the decedent and (2) would fail so to tax proceeds of insurance purchased by
the decedent for the benefit of his mistress. That criticism might be met, in
whole or in part, by one of the following approaches:
(1) The incidents-of-ownership test of Code section 2042(2) might be re-
tained as an alternative test for inclusion. If so, insurance proceeds payable
to the insured decedent's mistress or other nonmember of his immediate family
would be taxed unless the decedent parted irrevocably with the policy during life.
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(2) An exception to Proposal A could be created for insurance purchased
by an individual other than the insured with consideration shown to have original-
ly belonged to such person and never to have been received donatively from
the insured. (This language is similar to that of Code section 2040(a), relating
to joint interests.) To avoid tracing, there would be a conclusive presumption
that consideration for the policy comes first out of donative transfers from the
insured. Such a rule would ease the criticism described above regarding in-
surance purchased by members of the decedent's family, but would not permit
escape of insurance economically traceable to the insured (including insurance
held by an irrevocable insurance trust funded by him).
(3) The most far-reaching rule would be to extend Proposal A to insurance
held by, or for the benefit of, any individual other than the insured, whether
related to him or not. (There is probably relatively little such insurance held
by nonrelatives.) Commercially-grounded insurance, such as a policy held by
a lender, would be excepted.
Proposal B
To the extent that concern centers on the increase in the value of insurance
resulting from death, the gross estate could be redefined to include that ele-
ment of the insurance. The includible element, if it is not caught by Code section
2042(1) or (2) (which would be retained), would be the excess of the insurance
proceeds over the value of the policy immediately preceding death.
Problems presented
Problems that would have to be resolved under the above or other pro-
posals include:
(1) Death of the policy owner during the insured's life. (Logically, under
Proposal A, the policy might be exempted from estate tax at the owner's death.)
(2) Insurance owned by the insured's former spouse, perhaps as part of
the marital settlement.
(3) Whether policy loans should be distinguished from policy surrenders.
(4) The handling of insurance held by a discretionary trust where some
of the beneficiaries are individuals described in Proposal A and others are not.
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EXHIBIT F
ABA LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION NO. 1986-0
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports enact-
ment by Congress of amendments to Sections 2035 and 2038 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 along the lines set forth in Exhibit [1], attached, to con-
form to the provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the
Technical Corrections Act of 1982.
REPORT
The Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law has joint jurisdiction
with the Section on Taxation over matters relating to the United States estate
tax. This recommendation was approved by the Council of the Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, having authority to act for the Section, at
its regularly-scheduled meeting on April 24, 1983, at Point Clear, Alabama.
This recommendation was approved by the Estate and Gift Tax Committee of
the Section on Taxation at its meeting in Washington, D.C. on May 20, 1983,
and will be considered by the Council of the Section on Taxation as an ex-
pedited matter before the August, 1983 meeting of the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association.
In the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) Congress amended
I.R.C. § 2035 by adding a new subsection (d). This new subsection eliminates
most intervivos transfers from a decedent's gross estate. I.R.C. § 2035 as amend-
ed by ERTA and the Technical Corrections Act of 1982 now provides:
1. The gross estate includes any gift taxes paid by a decedent or his estate
on any taxable gifts made within 3 years prior to death.
2. Except for transfers for full consideration, the gross estate includes any
interest in property transferred within 3 years prior to death if such interest
would have been included in the decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. §§ 2036,
2037, 2038 or 2042 had it been retained by the decedent.
3. For purposes of I.R.C. § 303(b) (distributions in redemption of stock
to pay death taxes), § 2032A (special valuation of certain farms, etc., real prop-
erty), § 6166(a) (extension of time to pay estate tax), and subchapter C of Chapter
64 (lien for estate tax), the old rules of I.R.C. § 2035 apply, i.e., all transfers
within 3 years of death are includible in the gross estate except those for full
consideration and those small enough to come within the annual gift tax exclu-
sion so that no gift tax return was required to be filed.
However, as presently drafted I.R.C. § 2035(a) states the former general
rule: the value of a decedent's gross estate includes the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein which the decedent transferred during the
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3-year period ending on his death. Subsections (b) and (d) now set forth ex-
ceptions that render the former general rule meaningless, except for transfers
under (b)(2) (with respect to a life insurance policy), (d)(2) (within the scope
of I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2037, 2038 and 2042), and except for the special rules of
I.R.C. §§ 303(b), 2032A, 6166, and subchapter C of Chapter 64 that are re-
ferred to in subsections (d)(3) and (4).
The proposed rewrite of I.R.C. § 2035 is not intended to change existing
law but to be a nonsubstantive rewrite making the section more comprehensible.
However, the last sentence of proposed subsection (a) has been added to cor-
rect a potential but unintended trap in the present statutory language: All gifts
from a revocable trust, made by or on behalf of its settlor, may technically
be includable under I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) since any such transferred property
would otherwise have been included in the settlor's gross estate under I.R.C.
§§ 2036, 2037 or 2038, and not under I.R.C. § 2033. However, such a transac-
tion is analytically a distribution by the trustee to the settlor, followed by a
gift by the settlor to the donee, and should be subject to the same rules as ap-
ply to the settlor's donations as an individual.
As a corollary, all gifts from a revocable trust within 3 years of the set-
tlor's death would apparently also be caught by I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1) and (2),
as any such transfer could be construed as a relinquishment of a power to "alter,
amend or revoke" during "the 3 year period ending on the date of the dece-
dent's death." See Cremer, The 1981 Act and Section 2035: Problems and
Possibilities. 35 The Tax Lawyer 389, 393-4 (1982). In order to cure this prob-
lem and to let Section 2035 set the operative rules, it is recommended that
I.R.C. § 2038 be amended by adding at the end of I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1) and at
the end of the first sentence of I.R.C. § 2038(a)(2) the following: "(except when
such relinquishment results from a transfer from a trust as to which trust the
settlor has reserved a right of revocation)."
EXHIBIT [1]
PROPOSED REVISION OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 2035
SEC. 2035. ADJUSTMENTS FOR GIFTS MADE WITHIN 3 YEARS OF
DECEDENT'S DEATH.
(a) INCLUSION OF CERTAIN TRANSFERS IN GROSS ESTATE - The value of
the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any in-
terest therein of which the decedent has made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death, if such
transferred interest would have been included in the decedent's gross estate under
Sections 2036, 2037, 2038 or 2042, had such transferred interest been retained
by the decedent on the date of his death. The provisions of this subsection (a)
shall not apply to any transfer from a trust as to which trust the settlor has
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reserved a right of revocation unless such transfer, if made directly by the set-
tlor, would be a transfer to which this subsection (a) would apply.
(b) INCLUSION OF GIFT TAX ON GIFTS MADE DURING 3 YEARS BEFORE
DECEDENT'S DEATH - The amount of the gross estate (determined without
regard to this subsection) shall be increased by the amount of any tax paid under
chapter 12 by the decedent or his estate on any gift made by the decedent or
his spouse after December 31, 1976, and during the 3-year period ending on
the date of the decedent's death.
(C) INCLUSION OF TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DEATH FOR CERTAIN
PURPOSES.
(1) For purposes of Section 303(b) (relating to distributions in redemp-
tion of stock to pay death taxes), Section 2032A (relating to special valuation
of certain farms, etc., real property), and subchapter C of Chapter 64 (relating
to lien for taxes), the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, during the 3-year period ending
on the date of the decedent's death.
(2) An estate shall be treated as meeting the 35-percent of adjusted gross
estate requirement of Section 6166(a)(1) only if the estate meets the require-
ment both with and without including in the value of the gross estate the value
of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, during the 3-year period
ending on the date of the decedent's death.
(3) The provisions of (1) and (2) above of this subsection (c) shall not apply
to any transfer (other than any transfer with respect to a life insurance policy)
made during a calendar year if the decedent was not required by Section 6019
(other than by reason of Section 6019(a)(2)) to file any gift tax return for such
year with respect to such transfer.
(d) DEFINITION - For purposes of this section, the term "transfer" shall
not apply to any bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth.
PROPOSED REVISION OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 2038
SEC. 2038. REVOCABLE TRANSFERS.
(a) IN GENERAL. - The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property -
(1) TRANSFERS AFTER JUNE 22, 1936. - To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the
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date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever
capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction
with any other person (without regard to when or from what source the dece-
dent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any
such power is relinquished during the 3-year period ending on the date of the
decedent's death (except when such relinquishment results from a transfer from
a trust as to which trust the settlor has reserved a right of revocation).
(2) TRANSFERS ON OR BEFORE JUNE 22, 1936. - To the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (ex-
cept in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power,
either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person, to alter, amend,
or revoke, or where the decedent relinquished any such power during the 3-year
period ending on the date of the decedent's death (except when such relinquish-
ment results from a transfer from a trust as to which trust the settlor has reserved
a right of revocation). Except in the case of transfers made after June 22, 1936,
no interest of the decedent of which he has made a transfer shall be included
in the gross estate under paragraph (1) unless it is includible under this paragraph.
EXHIBIT G
NOTE: This study paper reflects various individual views, but does not reflect
the position of the task force or of a majority of its members.
Study Paper on Estate Tax Treatment of
Unrealized Appreciation in Value at Death
This study paper, submitted to the task force on transfer tax restructuring,
proposes a possible solution to the problem of unrealized appreciation in the
value of property at death.
1. Introduction
Assume (1) a flat estate tax rate of 50 percent, (2) an estate tax exemption
of $600,000, and (3) a top income tax rate of 28 percent. Identify unrealized
appreciation in value of property at death by the acronym UAVPAD. Finally,
assume a desire to subject UAVPAD to a rate of estate tax that would more
nearly equalize the tax treatment of those who sell during life and those who
hold until death.
The tax treatment of the seller and the holder could be equalized by
subjecting UAVPAD to an additional 14 points of estate tax, i.e., to a rate of
64 percent.
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Proof. A and B each has invested $2 million, which has increased in value
to $10 million. A sells during life, pays income tax of $2,240,000, has $7,760,000
left, incurs an estate tax of $3,880,000 and has $3,880,000 to bequeath.. B in-
curs estate tax of $6,120,000 (50% of $2 million plus 64% of $8 million), and
has $3,880,000 to bequeath.
An alternative would be to subject UAVPAD to a 50 percent estate tax and
the rest of the taxable estate to a lower rate. To equalize, the lower rate would
have to be 39.06 percent (50 percent divided by 1.28). For convenience, assume
rounding of the lower rate to 40 percent.
2. Proposal
The proposal is for a 10-point credit against the estate tax for the non-
UAVPAD element. More precisely, the base for computation of the 10-point
credit would be the amount "X" in the following equation:
Non-UAVPAD portion
X of gross estate
Taxable estate Gross estate
To prevent loss of credit where there are minor or unquestionable amounts
of UAVPAD, there would be a full credit unless UAVPAD exceeded $25,000.
(That figure could be larger.) Basis, in the absence of records, would be per-
mitted to be established by economic analysis, reasonable estimate, etc.
If desired, all property other than stocks, bonds, and property used in trade
or business or held for production of income would be non-UAVPAD property.
Examples of non-UAVPAD property would be personal residences, personal
effects, personal stamps or coin collections, etc. The need for such an excep-
tion is questionable.
To avoid the complex "floating basis" problem and to free from tax con-
sequences the earmarking of UAVPAD property for the marital or nonmarital
share of the estate, the credit in such situations would be computed as shown
in example (7) below. Normally, where the tax is charged to the nonmarital
share, the benefit of the credit would inure to that share. The same would be
true of the charitable deduction.
3. Examples of Operation of Proposal
Example (1): Gross estate of $5 million; non-UAVPAD of $3 million; debts
and charges of $400,000; exemption of $600,000; taxable estate of $4 million.
Computation:
Estate tax at 50% $2,000,000
Credit (10% of X [$2.4 million]) 240,000
$1,760,000
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Example (2): Same as example (1) except that there is a charitable deduc-
tion of $1 million, reducing the taxable estate to $3 million. Computation:
Estate tax at 50%
Credit (10% of X [1.8 million])
$1,500,000
180,000
$1,320,000
Example (3): Same as example (1) except that UAVPAD does not exceed
$25,000. Computation:
Estate tax at 50%
Credit (10% of X [$4 million])
$2,000,000
400,000
$1,600,000
Example (4): Same as example (1) except that everything is UAVPAD.
Computation:
Estate tax at 50%
Credit
$2,000,000
-0--
$2,000,000
Example (5): Same as example (1) except that there is a marital deduction
of $4 million, reducing the taxable estate to zero. Computation:
Estate tax at 50%
Credit
-0-
-0-
-0-
Example (6): Same as example (1) except that there is a marital bequest
of $2 million (a fractional share of the general estate), making the taxable estate
$2 million. Computation:
Estate tax at 50%
Credit (10% of x [$1.2 million])
$1,000,000
120,000
$ 880,000
Example (7): Same as example (1) except that there is a specific bequest
to the surviving spouse of an asset having a basis of zero and a value of $2
million (so that the surviving spouse succeeds to all the UAVPAD). Computation:
Estate tax at 50%
Credit (10% of X [$1.2 million])
$1,000,000
120,000
$ 880,000
4. Basis Adjustment
The basis of property in the gross estate with elements of UAVPAD would
be increased by the amount of "X." The increase would be allocated among
such property in proportion to the amounts of UAVPAD involved.
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EXHIBIT H
ABA LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION NO. 1980-5
TO AMEND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 TO MAKE IT
CLEAR THAT THE EXISTING RULE FOR ESTABLISHING THE VALUE
OF PRIOR GIFTS FOR GIFT TAX PURPOSES EXTENDS TO ESTATE TAX
AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX COMPUTATIONS AND
TO PROVIDE THAT USE OF THE UNIFIED CREDIT FOR GIFT TAX PUR-
POSES BE OPTIONAL RATHER THAN MANDATORY.
RESOLVED that the following Resolutions be submitted by the Section of
Taxation to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association:
RESOLUTIONS
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends to the Con-
gress that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 be amended to make it clear that
the existing rule for establishing values for gift tax purposes (by which the ques-
tion of the value of donated property is settled if a gift tax return has been
filed reporting the gift, a gift tax has been assessed or paid, and the time for
assessment of a gift tax deficiency has expired) extends to estate tax computa-
tions and to the tax on generation-skipping transfers and to provide that use
of the unified credit for gift tax purposes be optional rather than mandatory,
thereby allowing a donor to pay a gift tax and activate the existing rule;
FURTHER RESOLVED that the Section of Taxation is directed to urge
on the proper committees of the Congress amendments that will achieve the
foregoing results.
REPORT
Summary
Under section 2505, enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the unified
credit is required to be applied, to the extent available, to offset tax on lifetime
transfers. The statute requires use of the unified credit "allowable" (section
2505(a)(2)). This is a change from prior law under which use of part or all
of the lifetime exemption was optional. Gift tax due is computed with respect
to each transfer by reducing the gift tax generated from the transfer by the amount
of unified tax credit allowable at the time of the transfer.
The change made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 prevents a donor-taxpayer
from resolving issues of valuation if the value of the gift does not exceed, in
the judgment of the taxpayer, an amount which would incur a gift tax beyond
that covered by the available unified credit. Payment or assessment of some
gift tax is necessary to trigger the statute (section 2504(c)) which is designed
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to settle valuation questions. When a donor-taxpayer cannot activate section
2504(c), the Service may question the value of the gifts for the purpose of deter-
mining the amount of gift tax owed with respect to later gifts.Moreover, under
the unified transfer system, such questions may arise many years later in deter-
mining the estate tax bracket applicable to the donor's estate.
It is not clear whether the Service can question the value of lifetime transfers
where a gift tax was paid or assessed for estate or generation-skipping transfer
tax purposes. Section 2504(c) expressly applies to gift tax computations, and
the Code contains no counterpart for the estate tax or for the tax on generation-
skipping transfers.
It is recommended that a donor be permitted to use less than the full amount
of the allowable unified credit provided for in section 2505 and thereby pay
a gift tax which would start the running of the period specified in section 2504(c),
after which the Service would not be able to challenge the valuation of such
gift for future gift tax purposes.
It is further recommended that the Code be amended to make clear that
the provision for making the value of a gift conclusive for gift tax purposes
would extend as well to the computation of the estate and generation-skipping
transfer taxes.
Discussion
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 enacted a rule that prevents some donors from
using the procedure already in the Code for fixing the value of gifts in com-
puting the amount of tax on subsequent gifts. Under section 2505, added by
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the unified credit is required to be applied to reduce
or eliminate the gift tax otherwise generated by a transfer. See Rev. Rul. 79-160,
1979-1 C.B. 313.
Present law governing computation of the estate tax or the generation-
skipping transfer tax requires that post-1976 lifetime gifts made by a decedent
or a deemed transferor be taken into account in determining the amount of each
of those taxes as well. The Code does not contain a provision to settle ques-
tions of value of such gifts for estate or generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.
The effect of requiring a donor to use the unified credit "allowable" for
gift tax purposes is to prevent a donor-taxpayer from setting at rest issues of
valuation for transfers that do not exceed an amount which would generate a
gift tax beyond that covered by the credit. While the usual three-year statute
of limitations bars the service from assessing a deficiency in gift tax as to transfers
reported on a gift tax return, it does not bar the Service from increasing the
value of gifts reported on prior returns for purposes of computing the gift tax
payable in respect of later gifts. Section 2504(c) was enacted to remove this
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uncertainty from the tax system. Under section 2504(c), if the service does
not increase the value of a gift during the statutory assessment period, the ser-
vice is thereafter bound by the value reflected on the return for the purpose
of computing the amount of gift tax payable on subsequent transfers. Section
2504(c) applies, however, only if a gift tax is assessed or paid. When no gift
tax is assessed or paid, a later adjustment in value may be made.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, under former section 2521, a donor
was not required to use his $30,000 lifetime exemption and could thereby
incur and pay a gift tax and activate section 2504(c). The applicability of
section 2504(c) was significantly limited when Congress, in section 2505(a),
required use of the allowable unified credit to reduce or eliminate the gift
tax otherwise owed.
Another effect of the required use of the credit is that a gift wherein the
donee agrees to pay the gift tax, called a "net gift," is not possible unless the
donor's credit has been used in full. In Rev Rul. 79-398, 1979-49 I.R.B. 12,
the Service, focusing on the language of section 2505(a), held that in com-
puting gift tax a donor cannot elect to defer the use of the unified credit where
the donee undertakes to pay the tax. Consequently, net gifts cannot effectively
be made by a donor to the extent of his unused credit even though he may desire
not to use the credit.
Valuation questions should be settled when the evidence is fresh. The ser-
vice should not be permitted to adjust values many years after the transfer at
issue was made. This was the legislative purpose behind section 2504(c). After
the statute of limitations has run, the value of a gift for a prior year with respect
to which a gift tax was assessed or paid should be conclusive in determining
the tax rate to be applied to subsequent gifts. Similarly, where a gift tax was
assessed or paid, and the statute of limitations has run, the value of a gift for
a prior year should be conclusive in determining the rate of tax to be applied
to the donor's estate and in determining the rate of tax to be applied to a
generation-skipping transfer as to which the donor is the deemed transferor.
Under the Recommendation the change would be accomplished for gift
tax purposes by deleting the word "allowable" in section 2505(a)(2) and
substituting "claimed and allowed," as in former section 2521. A further change
would be made in section 2505(a) to make it clear that a part or all of the unified
credit must be claimed. It is intended that the administrative interpretation,
in the regulations and elsewhere, of these changes would be the same in prin-
ciple as that under former section 2521.
For estate tax purposes the change would be accomplished by making sec-
tion 2504(c) expressly applicable for "purposes of computing the estate tax
under chapter 11" as well as the gift tax under chapter 12. Though an argument
can be made that section 2503 incorporates the provisions of section 2504,
1988]
57
Holdsworth et al.: Transfer Tax Restructuring
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
thereby making available for estate tax purposes the existing provision for
establishing values for gift tax purposes where a gift tax is assessed or paid,
that result is not clear. Section 2001(b) refers only to section 2503, and section
2503 does not specifically incorporate section 2504(c). Moreover, section
2504(c) expressly applies for purposes of computing the tax under "this chapter"
(the gift tax).
Also for estate tax purposes, section 2001(b) would be amended by chang-
ing "payable" to "assessed or paid." Computation of the estate tax involves
determination of a tentative estate tax on the aggregate value of the taxable estate
plus "adjusted taxable gifts." From this tentative estate tax a deduction is taken
for the amount of gift tax "payable" in respect of gifts made by the decedent
after December 31, 1976. If the question whether the deduction for the gift tax
is the amount of gift tax actually assessed or paid or the amount of gift tax
"payable" is left open in an estate tax computation, the result could be un-
necessary controversies over value questions in respect of prior gifts. This open-
ing for the Service, or for the taxpayer, to argue about what gift tax should
have been "payable," should be closed. The change of "payable" to "assessed
or paid" would mean that the gift tax actually assessed or paid would be sub-
tracted in determining the estate tax (section 2001(b)). The words "assessed
or paid" are the same as in section 2504(c).
Computation of the tax on certain generation-skipping transfers under
chapter 13 also requires a determination of the amount of the "adjusted taxable
gifts" of the deemed transferor. For that purpose, section 2602(a)(1)(C) incor-
porates into chapter 13 section 2001(b) from the estate tax rules of chapter 11.
As noted above, section 2001(b) refers to "adjusted taxable gifts" as determined
under section 2503 of the gift tax rules in chapter 12. The Recommendation
would broaden section 2001(b) to include a specific reference to section 2504(c);
hence, that provision would automatically extend to. computation of the tax on
generation-skipping transfers under chapter 13. For ease of reference, section
2504(c) would also be expanded to make clear that it would apply to the tax
on generation-skipping transfers.
Although the proposed amendments are likely to generate revenues at times
earlier than under present law, the extra revenues to be anticipated from the
early payment of gift taxes may be relatively small when compared to the ad-
ministrative burden placed on the Service either to audit or to be bound by
values as reported on a taxable gift tax return. However, when a donor-taxpayer
files a return he has the initial duty to establish correct values, under penalties
of perjury. When a donor makes a full disclosure to the Service and pays a
gift tax, the onus of questioning that value in a timely manner should shift to
the Service. Certainty in the administration of the tax laws should override the
desire of the Service to be rid of administrative pressure. The Service may ease
its burden by including on the face of the gift tax return a box to be checked
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by the donor-taxpayer if any of the reported gifts are of a property other than
those (such as cash and listed securities) as to which there is generally no dispute
over value.
The Recommendation would return to principles applicable under pre-1977
law. It is anticipated that, as under pre-1977 gift tax principles, a donor who
desires to fix the valuation of transferred property for future transfer tax pur-
poses would defer a part of the available unified credit so as to incur a tax.
Though a sophisticated taxpayer may use these principles to his advantage, that
was possible (and widely accepted) under pre-1977 law; the need for machinery
to fix values is deemed to outweigh this concern.
The amendments would apply to transfers made after the date of enact-
ment. A gift made after the date of enactment may have the benefit of the rules
of section 2504(c) in the determination of any gift tax generated by any subse-
quent gift, in the determination of the donor's estate tax and also, if the donor
becomes a deemed transferor, in the determination of the tax on generation-
skipping transfers. Also a transfer at the death of a person dying after the date
of enactment would have the benefit of the rules of section 2504(c) to deter-
mine, for estate tax purposes and for the tax on generation-skipping transfers,
the amount of "adjusted taxable gifts" during decedent's lifetime and the amount
of gift tax "assessed or paid" in respect thereof.
A gift made between December 31, 1976, and the date of enactment would
not have the benefit of the new rules; however, if a gift tax were assessed or
paid, such a gift could have the benefit of the existing provisions of section
2504(c). A transfer at death which occurred between December 31, 1976, and
the date of enactment would not have the benefit of the new rules for estate
tax or generation-skipping tax purposes; the value of prior "adjusted taxable
gifts" would be conclusive for estate or generation-skipping tax purposes, only
if existing rules so provide.
The changes would not be made applicable to any transfers, by gift or at
death, made between December 31, 1976, and the date of enactment, to avoid
obvious retroactivity problems.
Tax Section Recommendation No. 1970-4, proposed in August 1970, 23
TAX LAwYER 999 (1970), and adopted by the Association in 1971, 96 A.B.A.
REP. 445 (1971), provides for related, but not inconsistent, changes in section
2504(c). Specifically, that Recommendation provides that if a gift tax has been
assessed or paid and the statute has run, (i) the Service would not be able to
adjust the amounts of exclusions and deductions, e.g., charitable and marital
deductions reported on a gift tax return (in addition to the existing prohibition
against adjustments in values) and (ii) the bar to adjustments would apply to
value, exclusion and deduction items reported on prior returns which enter into
the computation of the gift tax owed on the return at issue. It is recommended
that Recommendation No. 1970-4 be retained.
1988]
59
Holdsworth et al.: Transfer Tax Restructuring
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
No member of the originating committee or of the Council of the Section
of Taxation is known to have material interest in the Recommendation by vir-
tue of a specific employment or engagement to obtain the result of the Recom-
mendation. It is recommended that the amendment be given only prospective
application. In that case, clients would not be affected in any pending matter.
PROPOSED STATUTORY LANGUAGE
RESOLVED that the Section of Taxation implement the foregoing by urging
the following amendments, or their equivalent in purpose and effect, on the
proper committees of the Congress:
Sec. 1. Subsection (b) of section 2001 is amended to read as follows
(eliminate matter struck through and insert new matter in italics):
(b) COMPUTATION OF TAX. - The tax imposed by this section shall be
the amount equal to the excess (if any) of -
(1) a tentative tax computed in accordance with the rate schedule
set forth in subsection (c) on the sum of -
(A) the amount of the taxable estate, and
(B) the amount of the adjusted taxable gifts, over
(2) the aggregate amount of tax **[payable]** assessed or paid
under chapter 12 with respect to gifts made by the decedent after
December 31, 1976.
For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), the term "adjusted taxable gifts" means
the total amount of the taxable gifts (within the meaning of section 2503 and
as determined under section 2504(c)) made by the decedent after December
31, 1976, other than gifts which are includible in the gross estate of the decedent.
Sec. 2. Subsection (c) of section 2504 is amended to read as follows
(insert new matter in italics):
(c) VALUATION OF CERTAIN GIFTS FOR PRECEDING CALEN-
DAR YEARS AND QUARTERS - If the time has expired within which
a tax may be assessed under this chapter or under corresponding provisions
of prior laws on the transfer of property by gift made during a preceding
calendar year or calendar quarter, as defined in section 2502(c), and if
a tax under this chapter or under corresponding provisions of prior laws
has been assessed or paid for such preceding calendar year or calendar
quarter, the value of such gift made in such preceding calendar year or
calendar quarter shall, for purposes of computing the tax under this chapter
for any calendar quarter and for purposes of computing the estate tax under
chapter 11 and the generation-skipping transfer tax under chapter 13,
be the value of such gift which was used in computing the tax for the
last preceding calendar year or calendar quarter for which a tax under
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this chapter or under corresponding provisions of prior laws was assessed
or paid.
Sec. 3. Subsection (a) of section 2505 is amended to read as follows
(eliminate matter struck through and insert new matter in italics):
(a) GENERAL RULE. - In the case of a citizen or resident of the United
States, if claimed there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed
by section 2501 for each calendar quarter an amount equal to -
(1) $47,000, reduced by
(2) the sum of the amounts **[allowable]** claimed and allowed
as a credit to the individual under this section for all preceding calen-
dar quarters.
Sec. 4. The amendments made by sections 1, 2, and 3 shall apply to transfers
made after the date of enactment thereof.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The effect of the Recommendation is to extend to gift, estate, and generation-
skipping tax computations the valuation principles applicable to gift tax compu-
tations under pre-1977 law. Other substantive approaches have been considered
and rejected. Use of the unified credit itself, without payment of a gift tax,
might trigger the statute on valuation issues, but that was deemed too favorable
to the taxpayer and would place too great an administrative burden on the Service.
On the other hand, suggestions (i) requiring a donor to claim all or none (not
a part) of his available unified credit and (ii) prohibiting use of any remaining
credit after adjustments in audit were thought too great a burden on the tax-
payer, for the purpose of having two parties come together to fix value would
be accomplished and use at any time of any part of the unified credit is a valuable
"payment" by the taxpayer. Changing the evidentiary presumption in favor of
values reported by a donor-taxpayer for future transfer tax purposes after a
specified period of time or establishing a procedure for requesting rulings on
value questions were thought too radical a departure from prior concepts and
too complicated.
Conforming and clerical amendments have not been made.
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